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I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's watershed decision in United States v. Booker,'
which declared the United States Sentencing Guidelines 2 unconstitutional as
written and excised two sections of the Guidelines' enabling statute so as to
render them "advisory" rather than "binding" on the federal courts, 3 has produced ripples throughout the federal sentencing system that are likely to keep
courts and scholars busy adjusting to-and to some extent, creating-a new
sentencing paradigm for years to come. While the Booker decision has
prompted an abundance of academic commentary analyzing its holding and
debating the best course of sentencing reform to be taken in its aftermath, the
majority of academic discussion thus far has focused on Booker's direct effects
on federal sentencing. For example, the literature has discussed the appropriate
scope of the "reasonableness" review announced by Justice Breyer's remedial
opinion,4 what legislative steps, if any, Congress should take to reform federal
sentencing in response to Booker,5 and, of course, what the Court's dense and
"conceptually muddled" dual 5-4 majority opinions actually mean for federal
sentencing, both in terms of present practice and future developments. 6 Though
the analysis of Booker's primary effects on federal sentencing is obviously a
matter of overriding importance to the legal and academic communities, the
Guidelines' transition from a set of binding rules from which sentencing judges
could depart only pursuant to certain well-defined exceptions to a set of "advisory" principles from which judges enjoy greater discretion-the precise scope
of which remains unclear-to depart has created peripheral questions about the
interpretation and application of the Guidelines that have not been widely addressed in academic discussions. The Guidelines' post-Booker status is perhaps
sui generis in the body of federal law: they are something less than fully prescriptive legislative enactments that tightly bind the authority of the sentencing
court and yet, as this Article shall argue, something more than mere "guide1
2

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Hereinafter the "Sentencing Guidelines" or "Guidelines."

Booker, 543 U.S. at 266 (Breyer, J.).
See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Reasonableness Review After Booker, 43 Hous. L. REv. 325
(2006); Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peikin, Evolving Roles in FederalSentencing: The PostBooker/Fanfan World, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REv. 9 (2005); Daniel A. Chatham, Note, Playing with
3
4

Post-Booker Fire: The Dangers of IncreasedJudicial Discretion in Federal White Collar Sen-

tencing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619 (2007).
5
See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the FederalSystem, 43 Hous. L. REv. 341 (2006); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposalfor
ReconfiguringFederalSentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149 (2005).
6
Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387 (2006); see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENy. U. L. REv. 665 (2005).
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posts" or recommendations advising the court as to the exercise of its unfettered
discretion.7
This Article shall discuss one of the peripheral issues created by the
post-Booker Guidelines' unique status that has the potential to develop into a
significant split between the federal courts of appeals: whether the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the federal Constitution, which prohibits the retroactive application of criminal laws which, among other things, increase the measure of punishment for a criminal offense above the level that would have applied under the
law in effect at the time the offense was committed,8 continues to prohibit the
application of upwardly revised Sentencing Guidelines to criminal defendants
whose offenses were committed when some earlier, more lenient version of the
Guidelines was in effect. 9 Prior to Booker, the federal courts unanimously recognized that, notwithstanding the general rule that a sentencing court is to apply
the version of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date of sentencing, the Ex
Post Facto Clause prohibited the application of a revised Guidelines Manual to
the calculation of a defendant's sentence when that application would result in a
sentencing range higher than the one that would have applied under the Guidelines in effect at the time the offense was committed, a conclusion to which the
United States Sentencing Commission'0 belatedly acquiesced. In the aftermath
of Booker, however, a number of federal courts have held, or have suggested in
dicta, that application of the Guidelines to the calculation of a defendant's sentence no longer implicates ex post facto concerns, and that a sentencing court
must calculate every defendant's sentencing range on the basis of the Guidelines
that are in effect on the date of sentencing. The leading case in this group is the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Demaree," the only federal circuit court opinion to date that has ex7

Rifai v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 586 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1978); see infra Part III.

8

Article I of the Constitution contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses. The first, which pertains

to the federal government, states simply that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The second, which governs the states, provides that "[n]o
State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, [or] ex post facto Law ...." Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
References to the "Ex Post Facto Clause" in this Article shall generally be to the former clause,
which governs federal legislation such as the Sentencing Guidelines. However, because the constitutional analysis is identical under both clauses, reference will be made on occasion to federal
cases applying the latter clause. The seminal case of Calderv. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390
(1798), for example, involved an ex post facto challenge to a state law under Article 1, § 10, but
has formed the basis of the Supreme Court's ex post facto jurisprudence under both clauses. See
infra Part II.B.
9
One recent law review article has addressed this question. See Christine M. Zeivel, Note,
Ex Post Booker: Retroactive Application of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 83 CH!.-KENT L.
REV. 395 (2008). Although applying a somewhat different constitutional analysis, Zeivel reaches
the same ultimate conclusion regarding the constitutionality of retroactive application of the postBooker Sentencing Guidelines as does this Article.
10 Hereinafter the "Sentencing Commission" or "Commission."
1I 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 3055 (2007).
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pressly held that the Ex Post Facto Clause no longer prohibits the retroactive
application of upwardly revised Sentencing Guidelines as it did prior to Booker.
Other courts have held that the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to
Guidelines calculations was unaffected by Booker, and continue to apply the
version of the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense when the application of a later version would result in a higher sentencing range. Most of the
courts that have reached the latter holding, however, have done so only implicitly, by continuing to apply pre-Booker case law to post-Booker Guidelines calculations without considering whether the advisory nature of the Guidelines in
the post-Booker era removes them from the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
As this Article shall demonstrate, all of the courts that have held or suggested that the Ex Post Facto Clause no longer applies to the Sentencing Guidelines have done so on the basis of a purely formal methodology that looks exclusively to the de jure discretion to depart from the Guidelines that is afforded
to the district courts under the Supreme Court's Booker opinion and subsequent
decisions, while undertaking no analysis of the extent to which district courts in
the post-Booker era continue to perceive their sentencing discretion as being
actually constrained, as a practical matter, by the "advisory" Guidelines, or the
heightened level of appellate review-whether officially acknowledged or otherwise-to which sentences outside the Guidelines range are subjected by the
appellate courts. This formal methodology was developed by the federal courts
of appeals in response to a number of cases challenging the retroactive application of revisions to the United States Parole Commission's Guidelines for Decisionmaking on ex post facto grounds. The Parole Guidelines cases draw a categorical distinction for ex post facto purposes between legislative enactments that
are "laws" and those that are not, on the basis of the extent to which the governmental agency to which a given enactment applies retains discretion to disregard the enactment's recommendations in individual cases. The enactment is
held to be subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause only if the governmental entity's
discretion to depart from it is tightly constrained or nonexistent.
The purely formal methodology applied by the circuit courts in the Parole Guidelines cases was inconsistent with controlling Supreme Court precedent even as it was being developed. The Court's interpretations of the Ex Post
Facto Clause both before and after the Parole Guidelines cases were decided
have rejected bright-line classifications of "law" or "not law" for evaluating the
Ex Post Facto Clause's applicability to a given legislative enactment, and make
it clear that the adjudication of ex post facto challenges to the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines requires not only an analysis of the Guidelines' formal characteristics, but also an empirical examination of the degree to which the district
courts' sentencing decisions are actually influenced by the Sentencing Guidelines in order to determine whether the retroactive application of upwardly revised Sentencing Guidelines creates a substantial risk of increasing a defendant's ultimate measure of punishment beyond the level that would have been
imposed under the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense. Although the
Court's focus on the practical effects rather than the formal characteristics of

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss3/6
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legislative enactments when evaluating the applicability of the Ex Post Facto
Clause has been embodied in the law since the nineteenth century, the Court
recently reaffirmed the practical focus of its ex post facto jurisprudence in Cali13
2
fornia Department of Corrections v. Morales and again in Garner v. Jones.
Garner applied a two-tiered inquiry into both the formal aspects of a legislative
enactment and its empirically demonstrable practical effects in order to determine whether the retroactive application of the enactment is barred by the Ex
Post Facto Clause. Garner was decided after most of the circuit courts' Parole
Guidelines cases, and therefore was not available to the circuit courts during the
development of the ex post facto analysis applied by those cases, but it should
have alerted the Demaree court and the other federal courts that have expressed
sympathy for Demaree's holding that an appropriate ex post facto analysis requires not only a consideration of the district court's formal discretion to depart
from the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines, but also an examination of the
Guidelines' actual effects on sentencing outcomes. Applying the methodology
articulated by Garner,this Article shall conclude that the formal aspects of postBooker appellate review of non-Guidelines sentences make the Guidelines more
than merely "advisory" on the courts, and that the Guidelines continue to exert
sufficient influence over the outcomes of criminal sentencing proceedings that
they remain subject to the limitations of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Part II of this Article shall undertake a brief survey of the history of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines and the application of the Ex Post Facto
Clause thereto, both before and after Booker. Part III shall examine the historical development of the Supreme Court's Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence as
well as that of the methodology applied by Demaree, from its initial development by the federal appellate courts in cases addressing ex post facto challenges
to retroactive application of upwardly revised Parole Guidelines through its ultimate repudiation by the Supreme Court in Morales and Garner. Part IV shall
apply the Garner analysis to the post-Booker Guidelines, examining two formal
aspects of post-Booker appellate review of sentencing decisions-the presumption of reasonableness of within-Guidelines sentences and the extent-of-thevariance review applied to sentences outside the Guidelines range-as well as
empirical data demonstrating the practical effects of the Guidelines on outcomes
in post-Booker sentencing proceedings to conclude that, notwithstanding the
technically "advisory" nature of the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines, they
nevertheless continue to exert significant practical influence on sentencing decisions. In conclusion, Part V shall argue that because the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines create a substantial risk of increased punishment if applied retroactively, they are subject to the restrictions placed upon federal legislation by
the Ex Post Facto Clause.

12

514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995).

13

529 U.S. 244, 245 (2000).
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EX POST FACTO
CLAUSE AND THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES

The Sentencing Guidelines were initially developed in response to an
abrupt shift in the legal and political communities during the latter part of the
twentieth century away from the failed theories of penology that prevailed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This philosophical shift
haled into existence the contemporary era of criminal justice, in which the federal courts' power to craft individualized punishment for criminal offenders has
been curtailed and control over individual sentencing determinations has been
shifted toward the legislative branch and its administrative delegatees. When
the Guidelines were initially adopted, neither Congress nor the Sentencing
Commission expected that they would be subject to the constitutional limitations imposed on ex post facto legislation; however, the federal courts quickly
determined that the retroactive application of upwardly revised Sentencing
Guidelines implicated the policies underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the
Sentencing Commission eventually implemented remedial provisions to avoid
ex post facto violations in the application of the Guidelines. However, after the
Supreme Court's determination in Booker that the Sentencing Guidelines must
be rendered merely advisory on the federal courts in order to comport with the
Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial, some federal courts have expressed
skepticism toward the proposition that the retroactive application of upwardly
revised Guidelines continues to raise ex post facto concerns.
A.

HistoricalDevelopment of the Sentencing Guidelines Before and After
United States v. Booker

From the late nineteenth century until around 1970, the federal criminal
justice system operated on a "medical" model in which criminal offenders were
viewed primarily as patients in need of care and rehabilitation by the penal system.14 This model emphasized the rehabilitation of criminals, rather than punishment for or deterrence of crime, as the primary purpose of the penal system,
and called upon sentencing judges and parole officials "to craft individualized,
rehabilitation-oriented sentences 'almost like a doctor or social worker exercising clinical judgment.' ' 5 In order for district courts to discharge their institutional obligation to conduct the individualized assessment called for by the
medical model, it was necessary for them to enjoy essentially unfettered discretion to sentence offenders anywhere within the generally broad statutory ranges
set forth by Congress. Moreover, sentencing courts frequently imposed "indeterminate" sentences, placing the ultimate authority to determine the actual
amount of time that a defendant would remain incarcerated with the Board of
14

Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11 th Cir. 1984).

15 Berman, supra note 6, at 389 (quoting United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83
(D. Mass. 2004)).
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Parole. 16 The sentencing court also possessed some discretion to dictate the
point within a sentence at which the offender would be eligible for parole. Parole eligibility could not be postponed beyond one-third of the prisoner's total
sentence, but could be expedited to the extent that' 7 "[i]n theory, a person could
walk into prison one day and be paroled the next."'
Although the medical model of criminal justice presented a pleasant image of a merciful and sympathetic society, America's decades of experience
with that model revealed a significant drawback: the medical model did not
work very well at its avowed purpose of prisoner rehabilitation. As one study
conducted at the end of the medical model's era of predominance concluded:
When inmates with similar backgrounds and past records are
compared, neither institutional program participation and
achievement, nor disciplinary record, nor the level and type of
pre-incarceration or post-release supervision programs, have
any measurable impact on the probability of successful rehabilitation, the rate of recidivism, or the likelihood of later parole
success. Holding other factors constant, time served in an institution appears to have, if anything, a slightly negative effect on
the inmate's chances for success once he or she is released. Nor
do "expert" decisions by parole officers or psychologists appear
any more accurate in discerning likely success than decisions by
lay people. There simply is no way8 to know when "rehabilitation" has occurred in an individual.'
As the nation's infatuation with the medical model waned, many critics took
issue with the broad discretion bestowed on sentencing courts, perceiving the
courts' sentencing authority no longer as a tool for the edification and enlightenment of the downtrodden criminal offender, but rather as a source of arbitrariness and unpredictability in sentencing outcomes. Focusing on the fact that
district courts' unconstrained discretion in sentencing often created significant
disparities between the sentences of similarly situated offenders, judges and
lawmakers urged the adoption of tighter legislative controls over federal sen-

16

See id at 395 (medical model characterized by the "highly-discretionary indeterminate

sentencing systems that had been dominant for nearly a century"); see also United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d 1117, 1121 (11 th Cir. 1993) (under the medical model, "[p]rison sentences were..
• indeterminate in length, and periods of incarceration were imposed almost exclusively for the
purpose of rehabilitation; punishment, general deterrence, and specific deterrence were incidental
consequences of the scheme").
17 Panel, Future Trends in the United States Federal Sentencing Scheme, 13 Am.U. INT'L L.
REv. 1069, 1078 (1998) (presentation of Gerard Bard Tjoflat).
1s
Project, ParoleRelease Decisionmakingand the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 827
(1975) [hereinafter "Yale Report"] (footnotes omitted).
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tencing. 19 Judge Marvin Frankel of the Southern District of New York, for example, argued in 1973 that "the almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers
we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for
a society that professes devotion to the rule of law." 20 Senator Edward Kennedy
echoed Judge Frankel's sentiments, referring to the state of federal sentencing in
1977 as a "national scandal" in which the "glaring disparity" in sentencing
could "be traced to the unfettered discretion" exercised by judges acting "without any statutory guidelines or review procedures" guiding their deliberative
processes.21
The public movement for sentencing reform that took root in the 1970s
culminated in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,22 which expressly abandoned
the goal of prisoner rehabilitation as a primary purpose of incarceration 23 and
established the United States Sentencing Commission for the purpose of promulgating a set of binding guidelines that would constrain the federal courts' sentencing discretion into a much narrower range of permissible sentences.2 4 In
compliance with this statutory mandate, the Sentencing Commission produced
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the first edition of which went into
19

See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion:

The New Federal Sentencing

Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 883-84 (1990) ("The purpose of the [Sentencing
Reform] Act was to attack the tripartite problems of disparity, dishonesty, and for some offenses,
excessive leniency, all seemingly made worse by a system of near unfettered judicial discretion.
For decades, empirical studies repeatedly showed that similarly situated offenders were sentenced,
and did actually serve, widely disparate sentences. Furthermore, the disparity found to characterize federal sentencing was thought to sometimes mask, and be correlated with, discrimination on
the basis of a defendant's race, sex, or social class. For a system claiming equal justice for all,
disparity was an inexplicable yet constant source of embarrassment." (footnotes omitted)).
20
MARvIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973). Elaborating
on this argument, Judge Frankel observed that on the day that any given defendant appears for
sentencing, "[t]he occupant of the bench ... may be punitive, patriotic, self-righteous, guiltridden, and more than customarily dyspeptic. The vice in our system is that all such qualities have
free rein as well as potentially fatal impact upon the defendant's finite life." Id.at 23.
21
Edward M. Kennedy, Justice in Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1977, at 16. A Senate
report on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 identified other prominent proponents of sentencing
reform whose efforts led to the creation of the Sentencing Commission and the implementation of
the Sentencing Guidelines, including former federal judge Harold R. Tyler, Dean Norval Morris
of the University of Chicago Law School, Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School, and
Senators John L. McClellan, Roman L. Hruska, Strom Thurmond, and Joseph Biden. S. Rep. No.
98-225, at 37 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3220.
22
Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
23
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006) (instructing the Sentencing Commission to "insure that the
guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment").
24
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994 (discussing the purpose and duties of the Sentencing Commission). See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988) (discussing origin and purpose of
Sentencing Guidelines); Nagel, supra note 19.
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effect in 1987.25 The Guidelines' Sentencing Table identifies a narrow sentencing range for each offender based on the offender's "Criminal History Category" and the "Offense Level" of the offense, subject to various adjustments
based on the characteristics of the offense and the offender and certain universally applicable policy statements.26 The Criminal History Category is based on
a numeric score derived from the offender's prior convictions, and is divided
into six categories of increasing severity.27 The Offense Level assigns a score of
one to forty-three based on the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced
and the individual circumstances of the crime. 8 To calculate the defendant's
Offense Level, the sentencing court must first look to the base offense level
identified in Chapter Two of the Guidelines Manual; the base level must then be
modified to the extent that the court finds, on the basis of a preponderance of the
evidence, that various aggravating or mitigating circumstances identified in
Chapters Two and Three of the Guidelines apply.2 9 Having determined the defendant's Criminal History Category and Offense Level, the court then finds the
intersection of those scores on the Sentencing Table, which indicates the sentencing range prescribed for the defendant. Subject to certain limited exceptions
and grounds for departure, district courts were required under the pre-Booker
Guidelines to impose a sentence "of the kind, and within the range" identified
by the Sentencing Guidelines. 30 The Sentencing Commission is empowered to
review the Guidelines and propose amendments to them, often for the purpose
of altering a base offense level or sentencing factor that the Commission finds
does not optimally reflect the seriousness of the offense in question. 3' The
Commission submits an annual report of proposed Guidelines amendments to
Congress no later than May 1 of each year; if Congress takes no action to expressly disapprove of the proposed amendments, they become effective on No32
vember 1 of the same year.
Although the Sentencing Guidelines quickly attracted criticism from
federal judges and commentators who argued that they excessively constrained

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1987) [hereinafter "Guidelines Manual"].
See id. ch. 5 pt. A [hereinafter "Sentencing Table"]. See generally Deborah Young, Fact26
Finding at FederalSentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REv.
299, 322-31 (1994) (describing process of sentencing under the Guidelines).
27
See Sentencing Table, supra note 26.
See id.
28
29
See Guidelines Manual, supra note 25, § lBl.1(b), (c) (instructing district court to adjust
25

base offense level on the basis of offense characteristics identified elsewhere in the Guidelines
Manual).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2004), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245
30
(2005) (Breyer, J.).
31 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006).
32
See id. § 994(p) (2006).
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judicial discretion to tailor individualized punishment for specific defendants,33
or imposed penalties that were disproportionate to the offense,34 the Guidelines
system remained in place, subject only to minor annual amendments by the Sentencing Commission, until the Supreme Court's landmark Booker decision." In
Booker, a deeply divided Court issued two 5-4 majority opinions, holding the
Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment and excising two sections of the Sentencing Reform Act so as to render the Guidelines
purportedly "advisory" on the courts. The first opinion, authored by Justice
Stevens, relied on the Court's recent Sixth Amendment precedent 36 to conclude
that the Sentencing Guidelines' system of Offense Level adjustments, which
required the court to adjust the defendant's sentencing range on the basis of
facts found by the court under a preponderance of the evidence standard, 37 violated the Sixth Amendment's fiat that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. 38
Justice Breyer's remedial opinion did not follow the logic of Apprendi,
Blakely, and Justice Stevens's Booker opinion to its predictable end point by
holding that any facts upon which the Guidelines would permit an upward adjustment to the defendant's sentencing range must be submitted to the jury and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Breyer concluded that such an outcome would "destroy the system" crafted by Congress by "prevent[ing] a judge
from relying upon a presentence report for factual information, relevant to sentencing, uncovered after the trial" and would "undermine the sentencing statute's basic aim of ensuring similar sentences for those who have committed
For example, former Judge John Martin of the Southern District of New York identified the
"unnecessarily cruel and rigid" system imposed by the Guidelines as his principal reason for retiring from the bench, explaining that he "no longer want[ed] to be a part of our unjust criminal
justice system." John S. Martin Jr., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A3 1;
see also Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits
on the Discretion ofSentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992).
34
See, e.g., Freed, supra note 33, at 1686 (noting the "powerful sense" among district court
judges "that the guidelines dictate unjust sentences in too many cases..."); Markus Dirk Dubbler,
Book Review, JudicialPositivism and Hitler's Injustice, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 1807, 1830 (1993)
(observing that "[t]he federal sentencing guidelines are infamous for their brutal penalties in drug
cases, particularly in crack cocaine cases, which disproportionately affect minority defendants");
United States v. Ekhator, 853 F. Supp. 630, 632 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (describing Guidelines sentences
33

as "in far too many cases, draconian and irrational...
35

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

36

Justice Stevens's opinion relied primarily on the Court's holdings in Apprendi v. New Jer-

sey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
37
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 236-37 (Stevens. J).
38
Id. at 227-28 (Stevens, J.) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). In Blakely, the Court clari-

fied "that the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."
542 U.S. at 303 (emphasis omitted).
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similar crimes in similar ways.

39

Justice Breyer's decision instead opted to

excise two sections of the Sentencing Reform Act: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1),
which provided that the district court "shall" impose a sentence within the
Guidelines range, and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which provided for de novo review
of sentences outside the Guidelines range. The excision of section 3553(b)(1)
renders the Guidelines "effectively advisory, '4 ° thereby avoiding the Sixth
Amendment problem identified in Justice Stevens's opinion, though the district
court is still required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) to "consult" the Guidelines "and
take them into account when sentencing"41 alongside the other factors identified
in section 3553(a). The excision of section 3742(e) replaced de novo review of
sentences falling outside the Guidelines range with a single standard of "reasonableness" review for all sentences, whether within or without the now-advisory
Guidelines range.42 After removing these two sections to create an advisory
system subject to a single standard of appellate review, Justice Breyer's remeconcluded that the resulting system was "perfectly valid" constitudial opinion
43
tionally.
Although Booker asserted that the "reasonableness" review it created by
excising section 3745(e) was implicit in another section of the Sentencing Reform Act, 44 the precise scope of post-Booker reasonableness review has been a
source of significant confusion and disagreement among the lower courts.

45

The

federal circuit courts have, however, reached a general consensus that reasonableness review "encompasses both the reasonableness of the length of the sentence, as well as the method by which the sentence was calculated," and thus
incorporates both a procedural and a substantive aspect.4 6 A sentencing court
39
40
41

Booker, 543 U.S. at 252 (Breyer, J.).
Id. at 245.
Id. at 264. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (factors sentencing court must consider).

42

Id. at 262-63.

43
44
45

Id. at 258.
Id. at 261-62 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)).
See, e.g., United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (D. Mass. 2006) (arguing
that Justice Breyer's remedial opinion is responsible for the fact that "appellate guidance concerning when it is permissible for a sentencing court to deviate from the suggested Guideline range,
based on what facts, is mind-numbingly incoherent" (footnote omitted)).
46
United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted); see also
United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006). In United States v. Rattoballi, 452
F.3d 127, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2006) (footnote omitted), the Second Circuit succinctly stated the essence of post-Booker reasonableness review, observing that
[r]easonableness review has two components: (1) procedural reasonableness,
whereby we consider such factors as whether the district court properly (a)
identified the Guidelines range supported by the facts found by the court, (b)
treated the Guidelines as advisory, and (c) considered the Guidelines together
with the other factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and (2) substantive reasonableness, whereby we consider whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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applying the post-Booker Guidelines "must (1) acknowledge the applicable
Guideline range; (2) discuss the reasonableness of a variation from that range;
(3) consider the advisory provisions of the Guidelines; and (4) consider the
other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). ' ' 7 Failure to correctly follow that
procedure constitutes an error that renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable
under Booker.48 Courts have recognized that "it is more difficult to describe the
content of substantive reasonableness review, 'A9 but agree that it involves an
inquiry into "whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." 5 °
In 2007, the Supreme Court issued three opinions intended to clarify the
scope and operation of post-Booker reasonableness review. The general theme
of these opinions was to encourage sentencing courts to take greater liberties in
imposing non-Guidelines sentences, and to encourage circuit courts to take a
more deferential approach in reviewing the substantive reasonableness of nonGuidelines sentences. However, the extent to which these efforts will alter actual sentencing and review practices in the lower courts remains to be seen. In
Rita v. United States,51 the Supreme Court's first post-Booker decision to address issues of federal sentencing, the Court approved the application of a presumption of substantive reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences, a practice which had been adopted by seven federal appellate courts since Booker. In
his concurring opinion in Rita, Justice Stevens explained that substantive reasonableness review is equivalent to review for abuse of discretion, 52 while Justice Scalia argued that reasonableness review should be limited solely to its procedural component.53 In Kimbrough v. United States,54 the Court held it to be
substantively reasonable for sentencing courts to impose a non-Guidelines sentence on the basis of their disagreement with the 100-to-i ratio between crack
and powder cocaine that until recently was embodied in the Sentencing Guidelines for offenses related to those drugs. Finally, in Gall v. United States, 55 the
United States v. Howard, 216 F. App'x 463, 476 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct.
2900 (2007).
48
See, e.g., United States v. Canova, 485 F.3d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 2007) ("With respect to procedural reasonableness, '[a]n error in determining the applicable Guideline range or the availability of departure authority would be the type of procedural error that could render a sentence unreasonable under Booker."' (quoting United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2005))).
47

49

United States v. Wallace, 458 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 2006).

50

United States v. Bello-Mosqueda, 183 F. App'x 133, 134 (2d Cir. 2006).

51

127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).

Id. at 2470-71 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Simply stated, Booker replaced the de novo standard of review required by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) with an abuse-of-discretion standard that we
called 'reasonableness' review." (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005)
(Breyer, J.))).
53 Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2482 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
54 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007).
55 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
52
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Court held that substantive reasonableness review requires circuit courts to review all sentences, whether within the Guidelines range or not, under a single
abuse-of-discretion standard, though the appellate courts may continue to apply
56
a presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences.
B.

Ex Post Facto Doctrine and its Application to the Sentencing Guidelines Priorto Booker

The Ex Post Facto Clause bars any legislative act "which punishes as a
crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, which
makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or
which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to
The federal courts' interprelaw at the time when the act was committed ...
tation of the meaning and purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause 58 has remained
essentially consistent for over two hundred years, as courts today still cite the
Supreme Court's 1798 opinion in Calder v. Bul 9 as the authoritative statement
of the purpose and scope of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws.6 ° In Calder, the Court held that the phrase "ex post facto" is a legal term
of art that applies only to laws that retroactively increase criminal liabilities or
penalties, and not to civil matters. In reaching that conclusion, Justice Chase
observed that the purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause was not to "secure the
citizen in his private rights, of either property, or contracts ...[but] to secure
the person of the subject from injury, or punishment, in consequence of such
law. 6 1 Subsequent opinions of the Court have elaborated upon Calder's explication of the purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause, noting that its primary purposes are "to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and
changed," and to
permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly
"restrain[] arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation., 62

56

The Court's decisions in Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough shall be discussed in greater detail in

Part IV.A.
57
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169 (1925).
58 As previously noted, this Article shall refer to the two Ex Post Facto Clauses contained in
the Constitution collectively in the singular form because the Supreme Court's ex post facto doctrine draws no distinctions between the two clauses, and commonly cites opinions addressing one
clause when resolving a case arising under the other. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
59 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
60
Some scholars argue that this consistency has been one of form over substance. See, e.g.,
Wayne A. Logan, "DemocraticDespotism " and ConstitutionalConstraint: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.439, 465-66 (2004)
("Despite the fact that over the years the Court has, with regularity, insisted that the categories [of
ex post facto laws identified in Calder] are sacrosanct.., their erratic application has been disappointing to say the least." (footnotes omitted)).
61
Calder,3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 390 (Chase, J.).
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981).
62
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Calder and subsequent cases applying it identified two essential characteristics of ex post facto legislation, which remain at the core of the federal
courts' ex post facto analysis to this day: first, an ex post facto law "must be
63
retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment,,
and second, it must operate to the defendant's detriment-as Calder noted, retrospective legislation "that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law" does not fall
within the scope of ex post facto prohibition, but rather "only those [laws] that
create, or aggravate, the crime; or encrease the punishment, or change the rules
of evidence, for the purpose of conviction" may be invalidated when applied
retroactively. 64 Calder identified four categories of criminal laws that fall
within the prohibition of the Ex Post Facto Clause:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law
that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every
law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of65the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.
In Collins v. Youngblood, the Supreme Court conducted an extensive survey of
its prior ex post facto opinions, from which it derived a simple and concise
statement of the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause that is consistent with the
principles articulated in Calder: "[legislatures may not retroactively alter the
definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts. 66

63

Id. at 29; see also Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 391 (Chase, J.).

64
Calder,3 U.S. (Dali.) at 391. In addition to the two essential elements of retroactivity and
detrimental effect, the Court has also held that legislation that merely affects "modes of procedure" rather than "substantial personal rights" does not fall within the scope of ex post facto prohibition. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,

292 (1977) (holding that retroactive application of statute that permitted jury only to render an
advisory opinion as to propriety of death sentence was "procedural, and on the whole ameliorative," and therefore not in violation of Ex Post Facto Clause).
65 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
66
497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990); see California Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506-07 n.3
(1995) ("After Collins, the focus of the ex post facto inquiry . . . [is] on whether [a legislative]
change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable."). Although the Collins formulation of the ex post facto test does not expressly include
the fourth category of ex post facto laws identified by Calder-laws that retroactively alter the
rules of evidence to permit a conviction on less or different testimony than would have been required under the rules in effect at the time of the offense-the Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed the continued vitality of the fourth Calder category in Carmellv. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 539
(2000) (footnote omitted), which rejected the respondent's argument that Collins had abrogated
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When the Sentencing Guidelines were initially implemented, neither
Congress nor the Sentencing Commission anticipated that the Ex Post Facto
Clause would apply to revisions of the Guidelines that increased a defendant's
sentencing range above the level that would have applied under the Guidelines
in effect at the time the defendant's offense was committed.67 However, the
Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Miller v. Florida68 compelled the lower
courts and the Sentencing Commission to reconsider the issue. In Miller, the
Court considered an ex post facto challenge to Florida's sentencing guidelines,
which operated in a manner virtually identical to the federal Guidelines. 69 Under the Florida system, defendants were assigned a score based on the severity
of their primary offense and various other aspects of the crime and the defendant's personal characteristics. 70 The defendant's score was then compared to a
chart, "which provided a presumptive sentence for that composite score."',' The
presumptive sentence was "assumed to be appropriate, 72 and judges were permitted to depart from it only upon a finding of "clear and convincing reasons to
warrant aggravating or mitigating the sentence. 73 Only sentences outside the
guidelines range were subject to appellate review.7 4 The petitioner's challenge
involved two revisions to the Florida guidelines that were implemented after his
offense was committed, and which raised his "presumptive" sentence from 5 2
to seven years.75 The Supreme Court held that the retroactive application of the
revised Florida guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, noting that Miller
was "substantially disadvantaged ' 76 by the application of the revised guidelines
because they "directly and adversely affect[ed] ' '77 the sentence he received. In
reaching that conclusion, the Court rejected the state's argument that Miller was
not disadvantaged because he could not prove "definitively" that he would have
received a lower sentence under the previous version of the Florida guidelines,
presumably referring to the trial judge's ability to enhance a sentence on the
basis of clear and convincing evidence demonstrating the need for an upward
departure.78 The Court determined that, notwithstanding the possibility that
that aspect of Calder and characterized Collins as holding "that it was a mistake to stray beyond
Calder'sfour categories, not that the fourth category was itself mistaken."
67

See infra note 83.

69

482 U.S. 423 (1987).
Id. at 425-26 (describing Florida's sentencing guidelines system).

70

Id.

71

Id. at 426.
Id. (quoting FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.701(d)(8) (1983)).
Id.(quoting FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.70 1(d)(1 1) (1983)).
Id.(citing FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (1983)).
Miller, 482 U.S. at 427.
Id. at 433.

68

72

73
74
75
76
77

Id. at 435.

78

Id. at 432.
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Miller might have received the same sentence under the previous version of the
guidelines, he was nevertheless injured by the application of the revised version
because "it foreclosed his ability to challenge the imposition of a sentence
79
longer than his presumptive sentence under the old law.",
Although Miller did not address the implications of its holding on the
federal Sentencing Guidelines, the lower courts quickly developed a consensus
that the Court's reasoning was equally applicable to the retroactive application
of revisions to the federal Guidelines that were detrimental to criminal defendants.8 0 In response to the appellate courts' view that Miller compelled the
courts to apply the Ex Post Facto Clause to the federal Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission adopted U.S.S.G. § lB 1.11 (a) and (b)(l)-(2) in the November
1992 edition of the Guidelines Manual.8 ' Section lB 1.1 1(a) provides that, as a
general matter, "[t]he [sentencing] court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced." However, if the court determines that compliance with subsection (a) would violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause, subsection (b)(1) instructs the court to "use the Guidelines Manual in
effect on the date that the offense of conviction was committed," while subsection (b)(2), often called the "One Book Rule," directs the court to apply the entire Guidelines Manual in effect on a single date, rather than applying different
sections from different versions of the Guidelines Manual. For example, if the
court determines that the application of one section of the Guidelines Manual in
effect on the date of sentencing would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, it must
apply the entire Guidelines Manual that was in effect at the time the offense was
committed. In its commentary to section lB 1.11, the Sentencing Commission
reiterated its view that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines, but acknowledged that the section was added in response to the
federal circuit courts' holdings to the contrary.
In 1993, the Commission
79

Id. at 433.
See, e.g., United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1402-03 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Kussmaul, 987 F.2d 345, 351-52 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Golden, 954 F.2d 1413, 141718 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Molina, 952 F.2d 514, 522-23 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States
v. Morrow, 925 F.2d 779, 782-83 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Underwood, 938 F.2d 1086,
1089-90 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1041-42 (1st Cir. 1990);
United States v. Stephenson, 921 F.2d 438, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Suarez, 911
F.2d 1016, 1020-22 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Worthy, 915 F.2d 1514, 1516 n.7 (11th Cir.
1990); United States v. Swanger, 919 F.2d 94, 95 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). But see United
States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (arguing that the Ex
Post Facto Clause does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines because the "[g]uidelines are not
'laws' . . . the guidelines are administrative rules").
81 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1992).
82
See United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1403-05 (1lth Cir. 1997) (explaining the
One
Book Rule in detail).
83
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lB 1.11 (2002), application note background ("Al80

though aware of possible ex postfacto clause challenges to application of the guidelines in effect
at the time of sentencing, Congress did not believe that the ex post facto clause would apply to
amended sentencing guidelines. While the Commission concurs in the policy expressed by Con-
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modified the One Book Rule with the addition of section lB 1.1 l(b)(3), which
provides that "[i]f the defendant is convicted of two offenses, the first committed before, and the second after, a revised edition of the Guidelines Manual became effective,' 84the revised edition of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to
both offenses.
C.

United States v. Demaree and the FederalCourts' Emerging Disagreement About the Ex Post Facto Clause'sApplicability to Post-Booker
Guidelines Revisions

Although many federal courts have continued to apply the Ex Post
Facto Clause to Guidelines revisions in the post-Booker era, relatively few have
considered whether Booker's transformation of the Guidelines from mandatory
to advisory affects the applicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause to situations in
which a post-offense Guidelines revision increases the defendant's Guidelines
range to a level higher than that which would have applied under the Guidelines
Manual in effect at the time the offense was committed. At present, the Seventh
Circuit, in United States v. Demaree, is the only federal appellate court that has
officially adopted the view that the Ex Post Facto Clause has no applicability to
the post-Booker Guidelines.8 5 However, other federal courts have expressed
sympathy for Demaree's reasoning in dicta, and at least one district court outside the Seventh Circuit has applied Demaree to hold that the Ex Post Facto
Clause no longer applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. It therefore seems likely
that Demaree may become the wedge in an emerging circuit split on the issue of
the Ex Post Facto Clause's applicability to the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines.
In Demaree, Judge Posner wrote on behalf of a unanimous panel that,
notwithstanding the government's confession of error, the district court did not
err in calculating the offense level for the defendant's conviction for wire fraud,
which was committed in 2000, on the basis of the 2004 Guidelines Manual in
effect on the date of her sentencing, despite the fact that the application of the
2004 Manual increased the defendant's sentence range from 18-24 months to
27-33 months.86 The court recognized that several circuit courts have assumed,
without discussion, that the Ex Post Facto Clause continues to apply to the
gress, courts to date generally have held that the ex post facto clause does apply to sentencing
guideline amendments that subject the defendant to increased punishment." (citation omitted)).
84
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lB 1.11 (b)(3) (1993). At least one commentator
has argued that compliance with subsection (b)(3) is itself a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
See William P. Ferranti, Comment, Revised Sentencing Guidelinesand the Ex Post Facto Clause,
70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1011 (2003); see also United States v. Safavian, 461 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78-82
(D.D.C. 2006) (holding that compliance with subsection (b)(3) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
where the offense committed after the relevant Guidelines revision is unrelated to the offense
committed prior to the revision).
85
459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3055 (2007).
86

Id. at 792-95.
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Guidelines in the post-Booker era, 87 but rejected that assumption on the basis of
its view that "the ex post facto clause should apply only to laws and regulations
that bind rather than advise ... ,88 In support of this conclusion, Demaree relied on the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Barton, in which the court
suggested in dicta that "[n]ow that the Guidelines are advisory, the Guidelines
calculation provides no . . .guarantee of an increased sentence, which means
that the Guidelines are no longer akin to statutes in their authoritativeness. As
such, the Ex Post Facto Clause itself is not implicated" when a revised Guideline is retroactively applied to a pre-revision offense. 89 Demaree elaborated on
Barton's reasoning, observing that the Supreme Court has found the essential
aspects of an ex post facto law to be
whether it places the defendant at a disadvantage or substantial
disadvantage compared to the law as it stood when he committed the crime of which he has been convicted, changed the definition of the crime or increased the maximum penalty for it, or
imposed a significant risk of enhanced punishment,
and conceded that, if "interpreted literally," the Supreme Court's prior statements of the ex post facto doctrine "would encompass a change in even voluntary sentencing guidelines, for official guidelines even if purely advisory are
bound to influence judges' sentencing decisions.' 90 Nevertheless, the court determined that a "literal[]" reading of the Supreme Court's ex post facto decisions, "without reference to context," would be a "disservice" to the Court and
would produce a result in which "the constitutional prohibition [against ex post
facto laws] will be unmoored from both its purpose and the circumstances in
which statutes and regulations have heretofore been deemed to be ex post facto
laws." 91 The court concluded that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to
the advisory Guidelines because, although consideration of upwardly revised
Guidelines may influence judges to impose longer sentences than they otherwise
87

Id. at 793. Demaree cites a number of post-Booker cases in which circuit courts applied the

Ex Post Facto Clause to the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines without considering whether
Booker rendered the Ex Post Facto Clause inapplicable to the Guidelines. See id. (citing United
States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Roberts, 442 F.3d
128, 130 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d 470, 488 (1st Cir. 2005);
United States v. Iskander, 407 F.3d 232, 242-43 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Reasor, 418 F.3d
466, 479 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Harmon, 409 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Baretz, 411 F.3d 867, 873-77 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Foote, 413 F.3d 1240,
1248-49 (10th Cir. 2005)).
88
Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795.
89
455 F.3d 649, 655 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006).
90
Demaree, 459 F.3d at 794 (citing Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 255-56 (2000); California
Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506-07 n.3 (1995); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29
(1981); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401-02 (1937)).
91

Id.at 794.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss3/6

18

Dillon: Doubting <em>Demaree</em>: The Application of Ex Post Facto Princ

2008]

DOUBTING DEMAREE

1051

would have, the fact that the sentencing court's "freedom to impose a reasonable
sentence outside the [Guidelines] range is unfettered," and "subject therefore to
only light appellate review," renders the Guidelines' effect on sentencing too
indirect and uncertain to raise constitutional concerns. 92 The court further justified its holding by noting that, in light of the district court's discretion to depart
from the advisory Guidelines range, "a rule that a guidelines change cannot be
applied retroactively if it would be adverse to the defendant ... would have in
the long run a purely semantic effect," because the sentencing judge could always "say that in picking a sentence consistent with section 3553(a) he had used
the information embodied in the new (i.e., revised) guideline. 93 Because "[a]
judge is certainly entitled to take advice from the Sentencing Commission," a
district court that wishes to impose a longer sentence on a defendant for the reasons underlying the Sentencing Commission's subsequent upward revision of
the offense level for the crime of which the defendant was convicted could simply state that its discretion is guided by the Sentencing Commission's decision
94
that the offense should be treated more harshly than it previously had been.
Thus, Demaree concluded that since the district court could exercise its discretion under the post-Booker paradigm to sentence a defendant pursuant to an
upwardly revised Guideline range as if the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply,
there is no reason to continue to apply that clause to revised Guidelines offense
levels as had been done in the pre-Booker era.95
Although no other federal appellate court has yet adopted Demaree's
conclusion that the Ex Post Facto Clause no longer applies to the Sentencing
Guidelines, Demaree's holding has been applied numerous times by subsequent
panels of the Seventh Circuit and by district courts within that circuit, 96 and
several courts outside the Seventh Circuit have expressed varying degrees of
sympathy with Demaree'sreasoning. For example, in her concurring opinion in
United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, Chief Judge Jones of the Fifth Circuit approvingly cited Demaree for its "persuasive" presentation of the view that "[a]
logical corollary to Booker would seem to be that the ex postfacto clause does
not apply if the sentence imposed by the court need not be harsher under later
guidelines than it would have been under the guidelines in effect when the of92

Id. at 795.

93

Id.
Id.
95
Id.
96
See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 226 F. App'x 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Angle, 216 F. App'x 557, 559 n.l (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Drakulich, 209 F. App'x 599,
600-01 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Musurlian, 209 F. App'x 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Zimmer, 199 F. App'x 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Monti, 477 F.
Supp. 2d 943, 945-46 (holding that Demaree does not entitle government to seek to alter terms of
a plea agreement, which stipulated that Guidelines in effect at the time the offense was committed
would apply at sentencing, so as to apply upwardly revised Guidelines in effect at the time of
sentencing).
94
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fense was committed., 97 Chief Judge Jones noted that "[p]ost-Booker, the
guidelines are informative, not mandatory," and argued that "[a] purely advisory
regulation does not present an ex post facto problem solely because it is traceable to Congress and will possibly disadvantage a defendant., 98 Likewise, in
United States v. Mathis, the Eleventh Circuit noted in dicta that "post-Booker, it
is not clear that using one Guidelines Manual over another violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause" because when the Guidelines are merely advisory, "it is difficult
to say the Guidelines, rather than the district court exercising discretion, are the
source of the harsher punishment when the district court consults... the current
version of the Guidelines."99 In United States v. Gilmore, the district court cited
Demaree and Barton in support of its conclusion that the Ex Post Facto Clause
did not preclude the application of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date
of the defendant's sentencing, despite the fact that the revised Guidelines calculation increased the defendant's advisory sentence from 97-121 months to
life. 00° In United States v. Kingsbury, the district court found that Demaree had
"unmistakably cast into disrepute" the First Circuit's precedent applying the Ex
Post Facto Clause to the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines, but nevertheless
applied the Ex Post Facto Clause to the defendant's Guidelines calculation on
stare decisis grounds.101
Though Demaree has caused some courts outside the Seventh Circuit to
express doubts about the Ex Post Facto Clause's continued applicability to the
Sentencing Guidelines, most courts have continued to apply the Ex Post Facto
Clause to Guidelines calculations without mentioning the issues raised by the
Seventh Circuit's ruling. 102 Only four courts have expressly rejected Demaree's
reasoning by expressly holding or stating in dicta that the post-Booker Guidelines remain subject to the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws, and
97

488 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2007) (Jones, C.J., concurring).

98

Id.

99

239 F. App'x 513, 517 n.2 (11 th Cir. 2007).

100 470 F. Supp. 2d 233, 238-42 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). In the interest of full disclosure, it should be

noted that the author is currently a law clerk to the district court judge who decided Gilmore.
101 No. CR-05-5 I-B-W, 2006 WL 2575484, at *3 (D. Me. Sept. 1, 2006). Kingsbury's conclusion was implicitly rejected by the First Circuit's dicta in United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440
(1st Cir. 2007). See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
102
See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Stanford,
206 F. App'x 178, 179 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Gonzalez-Delgado, 195 F. App'x 120,
122-23 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Velasco, 465 F.3d 633, 637 n.3 (5th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 462-64 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Braggs, 196 F. App'x
442, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Stevens, 462 F.3d 1169, 1170-72 (9th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Leider, 203 F. App'x 226, 228 n.5 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Douglas A. Berman,
Third Circuit (Unthinkingly?) Applies Pre-Booker Ex Post Facto Rules, SENTENCING LAW AND

POLICY, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-andpolicy/2007/05/third circuitu.html
(May 17, 2007, 6:34 PM) ("The Seventh Circuit has given this important issue [of the Ex Post
Facto Clause's applicability to the post-Booker Guidelines] fitting attention in its Demaree opinion
...but other district and circuit courts (improperly) have taken for granted that Booker does not
change the pre-Booker rules.").
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only one of those courts undertook a thorough analysis of the issue in support of
its holding. In United States v. Gilman, the First Circuit acknowledged Demaree's holding but suggested that its applicability in the First Circuit "is doubtful.' ' 10 3 Gilman went on, however, to conclude that the appellant's ex post facto
argument was deficient on the merits, thereby avoiding the need to conclusively
resolve the Demaree issue.' 0 4 In United States v. Carter,10 5 the Eighth Circuit
briefly noted Demaree's holding but deferred to its own prior holding in United
States v. Larrabee, a post-Booker decision which "recognize[d] that 'retrospective application of the Guidelines implicates the ex post facto clause.",,10 6 In
United States v. Safavian,1°7 the district court cited Demaree in passing and
briefly summarized its holding, but tacitly rejected Demaree's reasoning by
holding that compliance with U.S.S.G. § 1B 1.1 l(b)(3) would violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause when the offense committed after the effective date of a Guidelines Manual revision is not related to the offense for which the revised Guidelines Manual increased the sentencing range. Finally, in United States v. Restrepo-Suares,10 8 the district court acknowledged the ex post facto issues discussed in Demaree and held, primarily on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Garner v. Jones'0 9 and the D.C. Circuit's holdings in the Fletcher v.
District of Columbia series of opinions, 1 0 that the Ex Post Facto Clause continues to govern the retroactive application of upwardly revised sentencing Guidelines."' Thus, while Demaree has attracted relatively little judicial comment
outside the Seventh Circuit thus far, 1 2 it seems likely in view of the divergent
positions taken by the handful of federal courts that have addressed this issue
that more circuit courts will adopt Demaree's holding as district court decisions
addressing ex post facto challenges to the post-Booker Guidelines increasingly
make their way into the appellate docket, thereby expanding the nascent circuit
split created by Demaree.

103

478 F.3d 440, 449 (1st Cir. 2007).

104

Id.

105

490 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007).

106

436 F.3d 890, 894 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Bell, 991 F.2d 1445, 1447 (8th

Cir. 1993)).
107

461 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2006).

108

516 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2007).

109

529 U.S. 244 (2000).

110

Fletcher v. Dist. of Columbia, 391 F.3d 250, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Fletcher v. Reilly, 433

F.3d 867, 876-77 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
111
516 F. Supp. 2d at 117-19; see infra Part III.C for a detailed discussion of Garner,RestrepoSuares, and the Fletcherseries.
112
In UnitedStates v. Jones, Nos. 05-1329,06-1105, 2007 WL 3302441, at *18 (10th Cir. Nov.
7, 2007), the Tenth Circuit recognized the emerging disagreement among the federal courts regarding the applicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines,
but took no position on the issue.
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF EX POST FACTO METHODOLOGY IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS

Implicit in Demaree's analysis are two fundamental principles of law
that the Seventh Circuit evidently believed to be dispositive of the ex post facto
issue: first, that the Ex Post Facto Clause draws a categorical distinction between "laws and regulations that bind"'1 13 the court and those that merely "advise" it with respect to the exercise of its discretion, and applies only to "binding" enactments that "guarantee"' 1 4 that a criminal defendant will receive a
greater measure of punishment than would have been the case under the law in
effect at the time the offense was committed, and second, that in determining
whether a particular legislative enactment is subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause,
the reviewing court need only look to the formal aspects of the enactment, making no inquiry into its practical effects or the manner in which it is actually applied. Although Demaree made only passing reference to the origin of these
principles," 5 they are both derived from the "predicative analysis"" 6 developed
by the federal courts of appeals in response to an ex post facto issue similar in
many respects to that presented to the Demaree court: whether the United
States Parole Commission's" 7 guidelines for assessing the suitability of federal
inmates for parole are subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. Every federal circuit
court to consider that question ultimately concluded that the retroactive application of revised Parole Guidelines is not subject to ex post facto limitation, either
because the Parole Guidelines are not "laws" for purposes of the ex post facto
analysis, or because upwardly revised Parole Guidelines, being "merely procedural guideposts" to the exercise of the Parole Commission's discretion, are not
detrimental to a parole candidate's interests, notwithstanding the Parole Commission's very high rate of compliance with the Parole Guidelines' recommendations when making individual parole determinations." 8 A compelling analogy can be drawn between the Parole Guidelines, which are technically "advisory" in the sense that the Parole Commission possesses some discretion to depart from the "presumptive" range of time to be served by an individual prisoner
113 United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3055
(2007).
114 United States v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649, 655 n.4, cited in Demaree, 791 F.3d at 794.
115
See Demaree, 791 F.3d at 795.
116

Kyle v. Lindsay, No. 3:06-0948, 2007 WL 1450402, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2007) (Man-

nion, Mag.).
117
The United States Board of Parole was renamed the Parole Commission by the Parole
Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 ("PCRA"), Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (1976).
This Article shall hereinafter refer to the federal agency responsible for making parole decisions
before the PCRA as the "Board of Parole," and to the same agency after the enactment of the
PCRA as the "Parole Commission." For general discussion without reference to a specific time
frame, the agency shall be referred to as the "Parole Commission."
118
Rifai v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 586 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1978).
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prior to parole, and the Sentencing Guidelines, which are advisory in the sense
that the sentencing court is required to "consider" the Sentencing Guidelines'
recommendations, but has discretion to depart from those recommendations
when the court feels that a sentence outside the recommended range is warranted.19 If the analogy between the Parole Guidelines and the Sentencing
Guidelines is a valid one, then the cases holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause
does not apply to the Parole Guidelines imply that the same result should obtain
in the case of the federal Sentencing Guidelines in the post-Booker eraassuming, of course, that the Parole Guidelines cases are consistent with controlling Supreme Court precedent.
This Part shall argue that the analogous relationship between the Parole
Guidelines and the Sentencing Guidelines does not justify Demaree's holding,
because the two fundamental principles underlying the ex post facto analysis
applied by Demaree and the Parole Guidelines cases were inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's ex post facto doctrine when the Parole Guidelines cases were
decided and have been further abrogated by the Court's subsequent pronouncements. The ex post facto analysis utilized by the Supreme Court both before
and after the Parole Guidelines cases were decided draws no categorical distinction between legislative enactments that formally constrain the court's exercise
of discretion within some arbitrarily narrow range of acceptable outcomes and
those that do not, opting instead to require a broader analysis of both the formal
characteristics and the practical effects of the enactment at issue. As the Court
clarified after the Parole Guidelines cases were decided, this analysis includes
an empirical inquiry into the manner in which the enactment is actually implemented by the government entity to which it applies, and seeks to determine
In Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 434-35 (1987), discussed in Part II.B, supra, the Supreme Court rejected Florida's attempt to analogize its mandatory sentencing guidelines to the
Parole Guidelines and to rely on the Parole Guidelines cases in support of its position that the
retroactive application of the Florida Sentencing Guidelines was consistent with the Ex Post Facto
Clause. The Court provided three bases for distinguishing the Florida Sentencing Guidelines from
the Parole Guidelines: first, having been enacted by the Florida Legislature, the Florida Sentencing Guidelines carried the "force and effect of law," while the Parole Guidelines presumably did
not; second, the Florida Sentencing Guidelines' requirement of clear and convincing evidence to
justify a departure from the guidelines range "create[d] a high hurdle that must be cleared before
discretion [to depart] can be exercised," while the Parole Guidelines provided mere "flexible
'guideposts"' to the exercise of the Parole Commission's discretion; and third, retroactive application of revised Florida Sentencing Guidelines would "directly and adversely affect the sentence"
imposed on Florida defendants. Id. at 435.
Demaree did not discuss at length the distinctions drawn by the Miller Court between the
Parole Guidelines and the Florida Sentencing Guidelines, but it is clear that the post-Booker
Guidelines more closely resemble the Parole Guidelines than did the Florida Sentencing Guidelines at issue in Miller, or the pre-Booker Sentencing Guidelines. As this Article shall argue in
Part III.C, however, subsequent developments in the Supreme Court's ex post facto jurisprudence
have undermined the premises on which the Parole Guidelines cases rely, notwithstanding the
Court's apparent acceptance of those premises in its dicta in Miller. Indeed, one federal circuit
court has recognized that its constitutional analysis of the retroactive application of the Parole
Guidelines was implicitly abrogated by the Supreme Court's decision in Garner v. Jones, 529
U.S. 244 (2000). See infra notes 228-229 and accompanying text.
119
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whether the enactment creates a significant risk-not a "guarantee"--that its
retroactive application will result in a greater measure of punishment than would
have been the case under the law in effect at the time the offense was committed. If the court concludes that the enactment does create such a risk, then the
Supreme Court's rulings dictate that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the retroactive application of the enactment, regardless of whether it is formally "binding" or "advisory."
A.

The History and Operationof the FederalParoleGuidelines

As discussed above,1 20 from the late nineteenth century until about
1970, federal sentencing law was dominated by the medical model, which
viewed the criminal offender as a sick individual in need of treatment and therefore placed primary emphasis on rehabilitation rather than on punishment or
deterrence. The same expectation that justified the investment of expansive,
virtually unguided discretion in the sentencing court to select a sentence within
a broad statutory range-that effective treatment required an individually tailored term of incarceration and rehabilitation-also justified the similarly expansive, unguided discretion vested in the Board of Parole to make determinations, subject to vague statutory directives and deferential appellate review,
about whether a particular inmate was sufficiently rehabilitated to be safely reintroduced into society via parole. Under the law in effect prior to 1972, the only
legal guidance on which the Board of Parole was compelled to rely in making
decisions was "the rather vague and general statutory directive that a prisoner
could be released on parole if (1) 'there (was) a reasonable probability that such
prisoner (would) live and remain at liberty without violating the laws,' and (2)
'such release (was) not incompatible with the welfare of society.' ' 12 1 Parole
hearings during this period afforded prisoners few procedural or substantive
rights, and the Board of Parole was not required to provide a statement of the
reasons for its decision to grant or deny parole.12 2 The individual prisoner, lacking a right to counsel or to present evidence in favor of her application for parole, "was merely to appear, to be scrutinized, to answer the questions put and
ask no others, and to assume the attitude he or she believed best indicated
'readiness' for parole.' 23 Not surprisingly, the Board of Parole's essentially
unfettered discretion and ability to make parole decisions without stating the
120 See supraPart II.A.
121 Warren v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 4203(a) (1970)) (alterations in original).
122
See Yale Report, supra note 18, at 820 ("The courts, to the extent they were willing to review the parole decision at all, agreed with the Board that any attempt to impose even minimal
due process constraints on the hearing or decisional process would unnecessarily interfere with
[the Board's] fulfillment of its duty to engage in psychological diagnoses and prognoses ....
(footnote omitted)).
123
Id. at 821 (footnote omitted).
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reasons on which those decisions were based led to significant disparity in outcomes among similarly situated parole applicants. 24 As the federal legal system
moved from the rehabilitation-based model to the current punishment- and deterrence-based one, the degree of discretion vested in the Board of Parole came
to be seen not as a desirable feature of a criminal justice system operating in the
best interests of the inmates, but as a source of unpredictability in the decisionmaking process and unjustifiable disparity in the treatment of parole applicants.
"Critics called for structuring discretion
through articulated standards, or for
' 25
eliminating discretion altogether."'
The Board of Parole responded to these concerns in 1972 by implementing a "pilot" system of "Guidelines for Decision-Making" that operate in a
manner strikingly similar to the Sentencing Guidelines that were promulgated
fifteen years later. 126 The Parole Guidelines assign each parole applicant two
scores: Offense Severity, which ranges from one to six and reflects the severity
of the offense for which the offender was originally sentenced as well as any
criminal offenses committed while on probation, 127 and "Parole Prognosis," also
known as an offender's "Salient Factor" score, a "risk prediction"', 28 scale of one
to ten indicating the likelihood that the inmate could be successfully reintegrated
as a productive and law-abiding member of society. 129 After calculating an inmate's Offense Severity and Salient Factor scores, the Parole Commission locates the intersection of those scores on a chart, which indicates a range of
months for each combination. This range of months is the "customary range of
time to be served before release"'' 30 based on the inmate's scores; however, the
Parole Guidelines state explicitly that "[t]hese time ranges are merely guidelines. Where the circumstances warrant, decisions outside of the guidelines

124 See, e.g., id. at 837 ("A primary purpose of instituting the [Parole] Guidelines was to struc-

ture discretion and thereby reduce inequality of treatment." (footnote omitted)).
125 Id. at 822 (citing Note, JudicialApplication of ProceduralDue Process in Parole Release
and Revocation, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1017 (1973); and Comment, CurbingAbuse in the Decision to Grant or Deny Parole,8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 419 (1973)).
126 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1972). See generally Yale Report, supra note 18, at 822-33. The Parole
Guidelines were nominally repealed, and the Parole Commission dissolved, by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984), which implemented the
Sentencing Guidelines and abolished the parole system for all defendants convicted after November 1, 1987. However, Congress has repeatedly extended the life of the Parole Commission, most
recently in the United States Parole Commission Extension and Sentencing Commission Authority Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-76, § 2, 119 Stat. 2035 (2005). The Parole Guidelines remain
applicable to federal prisoners convicted before November 1, 1987.
127 See 28 C.F.R. § 2.200)(1) (1972).
128 Yale Report, supra note 18, at 823.
129 The version of the Parole Guidelines in effect today utilizes an Offense Severity scale of one
to eight rather than one to six, but otherwise operates in a manner identical to the Parole Guidelines initially introduced in 1972. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1972) with 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (2007).
130 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(b) (1972).
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(either above or below) may be rendered.' 3' 1 Notwithstanding the fact that the
Parole Commission has de jure discretion to depart from the Parole Guidelines'
recommendations, the Parole Guidelines were "designed to ...[lead to] more
nearly uniform decisions, and more restricted decision-making. 132 Immediately
after the Parole Guidelines' implementation, a large majority of the Board
of
33
Parole's decisions fell within the Parole Guidelines' recommended range.
The Parole Guidelines pilot system expanded across all regions between
1972 and 1974, and was formally implemented by the Parole Commission and
Reorganization Act of 1976,134 which announced a shift in federal criminal policy from the medical model to a punishment- and deterrence-based model in
which "any rehabilitation an offender might obtain would be a coincidental result of his incarceration." 135 Under the PCRA, the Parole Commission is permitted to depart from the Parole Guidelines only upon a finding of "good
cause"' 136 for doing so, and the Commission's determination that good cause has
been shown is subject to judicial review. 137 The Parole Guidelines themselves,
however, continued to operate after the PCRA essentially as they did when the
pilot program was initially implemented in 1972.138
B.

The Circuit Courts'Application of Ex Post FactoPrinciplesto the
Parole Guidelines

After the Parole Guidelines system went into effect, the federal circuit
courts were soon inundated with appeals by federal prisoners arguing that the
application of upwardly revised Parole Guidelines to prisoners who were sentenced prior to the revision in question violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by
extending the amount of time that the prisoner must serve before being granted
parole, thereby effectively extending the prisoner's sentence. Although the Supreme Court never directly addressed this issue, Justice Rehnquist, sitting as a
Circuit Justice, held that the application of revised Parole Guidelines did not
implicate ex post facto concerns, and every federal appellate court to address the
issue reached the same conclusion. The majority of appellate courts held that
the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply to the Parole Guidelines because they
were not sufficiently binding on the Parole Commission's exercise of discretion
131 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(c) (1972).
132
Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See Yale Report, supra note 18, at 825 n.75 (noting that in the first six months after the
Parole Guidelines' effective date, 91.7 percent of the Board of Parole's decisions were within the
Parole Guidelines range).
134
Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (1976).
135 Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11 th Cir. 1984).
136
18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) (1976).
133

137 Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
138

See Warren v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 191-92 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (describing

operation of the Parole Guidelines after PCRA).
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to qualify as "laws," while the Third Circuit found that the exercise of discretion
did not necessarily remove the Parole Guidelines from the scope of the Ex Post
Facto Clause, but concluded as a practical matter that the Parole Guidelines
were applied with sufficient flexibility that they lacked the binding force characteristic of law.
The earliest effort by a federal appellate court to resolve an ex post facto
challenge to the retroactive application of the Parole Guidelines was the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Ruip v. United States.' 39 In that case, the appellant, having
pleaded guilty to involvement in an armed bank robbery, was sentenced on July
27, 1971, to a term of imprisonment of 18 years. 140 After Ruip's sentencing but
prior to his initial parole hearing, the Parole Commission adopted the Parole
Guidelines "to promote what it felt was a more consistent and equitable exercise
of its discretion.",1 4 ' At Ruip's initial hearing, the panel recommended that he be
released on parole on January 20, 1976; however, the panel's recommendation
was rejected by the National Appellate Board on the ground that, notwithstanding Ruip's favorable institutional record, the Parole Guidelines applicable to
him "indicate[d] a range of more than 65 months to be served before release for
cases with good institutional program performance and adjustment.' 42 The
National Appellate Board therefore ruled that Ruip's incarceration would con143
tinue until March 1977, at which point he would be reconsidered for parole.
Ruip commenced an action in federal court challenging the application of the
Parole Guidelines to his case on ex post facto grounds. The district court denied
relief, and on appeal, the Sixth Circuit, while recognizing that parole decisions
were "based not on formally articulated criteria or policies, but on the discretionary judgment of the members of the Parole Commission" at the time the
appellant was sentenced, nevertheless held that application of the formalized
Parole Guidelines to Ruip's case did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the Parole Guidelines "are not law, but guideposts which assist the Parole
Commission ... in exercising its discretion."' 44 In support that conclusion, the
court observed that the guidelines "are not fixed and rigid, but are flexible. The
remains free to make parole decisions outside of these
[Parole] Commission
145
guidelines.'
139
555 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1977), abrogation recognized by Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372,
380-81 (6th Cir. 2007)); see infra Part Ill(C) (discussing the Sixth Circuit's recognition in Michael that its prior decision in Ruip was implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court's ruling in
Garnerv. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000)).
Ruip, 555 F.2d at 1332-33.
140
141

Id. at 1333 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976)).

142

Id.

143

Id.

144 Id.

145 Id.; cf Kellogg v. Shoemaker, 46 F.3d 503, 509 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that revised Ohio
parole regulation that mandated revocation of parole for any parolee convicted of a crime while on
parole, which was previously a decision committed to the discretion of the Ohio Adult Parole
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Although Ruip addressed an ex post facto challenge to a situation in
which the Parole Guidelines were applied to an offender whose crime was
committed during the pre-guidelines era in which the Parole Commission enjoyed virtually unguided discretion in evaluating parole applications, 46 its reasoning was followed by many other federal courts in cases in which an appellant
whose offense was committed after the formal Parole Guidelines were implemented objected on ex post facto grounds to the retroactive application of a revision to the Parole Guidelines that increased the appellant's Offense Severity or
Salient Factor score, thus resulting in a longer presumptive range than would
have been the case under the Parole Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense. 147 For example, in Rifai v. United States, 148 a ruling that was reaffirmed
en banc in Wallace v. Christensen,149 the Ninth Circuit held that the Parole
Commission's application of the Parole Guidelines in effect at the time of the
appellant's parole hearing did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, notwithstanding the fact that the revised Parole Guidelines were less favorable to the
appellant than the Parole Guidelines in effect at the time the appellant's offense
was committed, because the Parole Guidelines were mere "procedural guideposts without the characteristics of laws.' ' °
The majority of federal appellate courts relied on a purely formal interpretive approach when evaluating the applicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause
to revised Parole Guidelines. That is, despite the occasional suggestion that the
Authority, violated Ex Post Facto Clause when retroactively applied; distinguishing Ruip on the
ground that Kellogg "involves binding regulations that are mandatory after September 1, 1992,
and eliminates any discretion in the parole agency to consider mitigating circumstances").
146 Other cases addressed substantially identical facts, holding that the application
of the Parole
Guidelines system to the cases of prisoners whose crimes were committed before the Parole
Guidelines were implemented did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See, e.g., Warren v. U.S.
Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that retroactive application of the
Parole Guidelines to parole candidate whose offense was committed prior to the Parole Guidelines' implementation did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because "[a] change merely in the
manner in which the Board, now the Commission, exercises its discretion thus cannot offend the
ex post facto clause"); Farmer v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 588 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Paschal v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1173, 1180 (1 lth Cir. 1984) (application of Florida parole guidelines to state prisoner whose crime was committed before guidelines were adopted did not violate
Ex Post Facto Clause because "[t]he guidelines merely stated and rationalized the exercise of the
[Florida] Parole Commission's discretion").
147 See, e.g., Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating in dicta that "the
guidelines do not constitute impermissible ex post facto laws when applied to an adult offender
since... they merely clarify the exercise of administrative discretion..."); Priore v. Nelson, 626
F.2d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 1980); Stroud v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 668 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1982); Inglese v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 768 F.2d 932 (7th Cir. 1985); Prater v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 802
F.2d 948, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1986); Yamamoto v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 794 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir.
1986); Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984).
148 586 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1978).
149 802 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
150

Rifai, 586 F.2d at 698, quoted in Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1553.
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practical effects of revised Parole Guidelines on individual parole decisions
might be relevant to the ex post facto inquiry, the courts generally restricted
their analysis to the language of the Parole Guidelines and their enabling statutes, holding that, so long as the regulatory scheme implementing the Parole
Guidelines preserved the Parole Commission's de jure discretion to depart from
the Parole Guidelines' recommendations in cases where it found such departure
to be appropriate, the Parole Guidelines did not carry the force of law and therefore the retroactive application of revised Parole Guidelines could not implicate
ex post facto concerns, even though, as an empirical matter, the Parole Commission's decisions complied with the Parole Guidelines' recommendations in most
cases. For example, Wallace rejected the appellant's argument that the Parole
Guidelines were "laws" because approximately 85% of the Parole Commission's decisions fell within the recommended range as established by the Parole
Guidelines, observing that "[g]iven the discretion retained by the Commission,
the frequency with which the Guidelines are followed does not convert the
Guidelines into laws for purposes of the ex post facto clause."' 5 1 In Inglese v.
United States Parole Commission, the Seventh Circuit rejected the same argument, holding that "[t]he key to finding that guidelines are guides merely, and
not laws, is that the Parole Commission has a congressional mandate, expressed
both in the statute and the regulations, to exercise discretion. How often that
discretion is exercised is immaterial."' 5 2 Virtually all of the other appellate
courts to consider the issue reached the same conclusion.' 53 Although the Supreme Court never considered a prisoner's assertion that the application of revised Parole Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, Justice Rehnquist,
sitting as a Circuit Justice, adopted the view of the consensus of federal circuit
courts in Portley v. Grossman. 54 In that case, Justice Rehnquist denied an application for a stay of execution of the Ninth Circuit's mandate denying the applicant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the application of the
Parole Guidelines in effect at the time of the applicant's eligibility for re-parole
did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because "the guidelines operate only to
provide a framework for the Commission's exercise of its statutory discretion,"
and therefore "neither deprive
applicant of any pre-existing right nor enhance
' 55
the punishment imposed."'
151

Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1554; see also Rifai, 586 F.2d at 698 (rejecting similar argument while

noting that "[u]nder this theory, any policy or practice followed with some frequency would constitute a 'law' from which an agency could not vary").
152
768 F.2d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
153
For example, in Dufresne, the Eleventh Circuit held that even though the Parole Commission complied with the Parole Guidelines "in the vast majority of cases," and despite the fact that
the Commission was empowered to depart from the Parole Guidelines only for good cause, the Ex
Post Facto Clause did not apply because "[t]he Commission may follow its guidelines, disregard
them, or change them. Parole remains an act of discretion." 744 F.2d at 1550 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 4206(c) (1982)).
154

155

444 U.S. 1311 (1980).
Id.at 1312.
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Only the Third Circuit initially resisted the consensus among the federal
appellate courts that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the Parole
Guidelines, reasoning that the Parole Commission's very high rate of compliance with the Parole Guidelines' recommendations, coupled with the enhanced
level of appellate review of decisions to depart, might mean that, as a practical
matter, the Parole Commission lacked any appreciable authority to depart from
the Parole Guidelines the majority of cases, thus giving the Parole Guidelines
156
the force and effect of law. In Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission,
the appellant was convicted in 1973 of conspiracy to commit extortion and making false declarations to a grand jury, and ultimately sentenced to a term of incarceration of 30 months. 5 7 Like Ruip, Geraghty's offense was committed prior
to the implementation of the Parole Guidelines pilot program, but by the time of
his first parole hearing, the Board of Parole had implemented the pilot program
in Geraghty's region. Although Geraghty was eligible for immediate parole, the
applicable Parole Guidelines identified a presumptive range of 26-36 months to
be served before parole.' 58 The Board of Parole therefore denied his application
for parole on the ground that a downward departure from the Parole Guidelines'
recommended range "[did] not appear warranted."' 59 Because of his relatively
short 30-month sentence, the Board of Parole's compliance with the 26-36
month range meant that Geraghty "could not be granted parole before the end of
his sentence as reduced by 'good time' credits." 160 In 1976, after his second
application for parole was denied on similar grounds, Geraghty commenced a
class action against the Parole Commission in which he argued that the application of the Parole Guidelines to prisoners who had been convicted and sentenced
while the previous parole system was in effect violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 16 ' The district court denied class certification and dismissed the action, 162 and the Third Circuit reversed, noting that the legislative history to the
PCRA indicates that the Parole Guidelines "are designed to be not mere hortatory clarifications of policy, but rules which are to be followed except for substantial reason to the contrary, ' 63 and holding that the Parole Commission's
high rate of compliance with the Parole Guidelines' presumptive ranges 164
156

579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).

157 Id.at 242 n.7.
158

Id. at 242.

159

Id.

160

id.

161

Although Geraghty's sentence was completed shortly after his second application for parole

was denied in June 1976, the Third Circuit held that he was not barred by the mootness doctrine
from maintaining a class action challenging the retroactive application of the Parole Guidelines to
similarly situated federal prisoners. Id.at 252.
162
See Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F. Supp. 737 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
163
Geraghty, 579 F.2d at 267 (quotation marks omitted).
164 See id.(noting the Parole Commission's concession that "in 1975 prisoners were granted
parole prior to their 'customary release dates' in only 8.7% of cases").
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raised a question of material fact as to whether the Parole Commission "engages
in individualized consideration of prisoners similar to that which it undertook
before the guidelines went into effect .... ,,165 The Geraghty court intimated
that, if the Parole Commission did not actually exercise substantial discretion to
depart from the Parole Guidelines in appropriate cases, then the "'channel for
discretion' provided by the guidelines" might be "in actuality an unyielding
conduit," in which case the application of upwardly revised Parole Guidelines to
of the
a prisoner whose crime was committed when a more favorable version
166
Parole Guidelines was in effect would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision in Geraghty
without reaching the merits of the ex post facto issue, 167 and the Third Circuit
subsequently revisited the issue in UnitedStates ex rel. Formanv. McCall. 68 In
that case, the Third Circuit "reaffirm[ed] Geraghty's holding that the retroactive
application of parole guidelines may constitute a violation of the ex post facto
clause,"' 169 concluding that the extent to which the Parole Commission actually
exercised discretion in individual parole determinations, as opposed to operating
mechanically on the basis of the Parole Guidelines grid, was an issue of fact
dispositive of the question whether the application of upwardly revised Parole
Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. FormanI addressed more explicitly than Geraghty had the underlying question to which the issue of the Parole
Commission's discretion was directly relevant: whether the Parole Guidelines
qualified as "laws" subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. Forman I acknowledged the "decisions of other courts that have found the guidelines 'not [to] constitute impermissible ex post facto laws [because] they merely clarify the exercise of administrative discretion without altering any existing considerations for
parole release,"' 170 but rejected that conclusion on the ground that, because the
Parole Guidelines "define a fairly tight statutory framework to circumscribe the
Board's statutorily broad power,"' 7'1 the Parole Guidelines would carry the force
165

Id.

166

Id.

167

See U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
709 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter "Forman 1'].
Id. at 853 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 860 (quoting Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1977)) (alterations in

168
169
170

original).
171 Forman I, 709 F.2d at 861 (quoting Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)). Pickus held that the Parole Board's revisions to the Parole Guidelines were subject to
the rulemaking protocols of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 553, rejecting
the Parole Board's argument that the Parole Guidelines were mere "interpretative rules" or "general statements of policy." 507 F.2d at 1113-14. In reaching that holding, Pickus concluded that
the Parole Guidelines did not fall within the APA's exception for "rules of agency procedure and
practice" because they were "likely to have considerable impact on ultimate agency decisions."
Id. at 1114. Notwithstanding the apparent relevance of the Pickus court's determination that the
Parole Guidelines "have the effect of law and are not reviewable except for arbitrariness," id., to
the issue of their status as law in the context of ex post facto challenges to the retroactive applica-
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of law, and therefore be subject to the limitations of the Ex Post Facto Clause,
"if applied without substantial flexibility."' 72 Following Geraghty's example,
however, Forman I declined to hold as a matter of law that the Parole Guidelines were "'laws' within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause,"' 73 holding
instead that "[i]n light of the importance of the constitutional question before us,
the contrary holdings of other courts of appeals, and the opinion in Geraghty,"
the case should be remanded to the district court to conduct fact finding on the
question 4whether "the Parole Commission does in fact act with substantial flexi17
bility."'
On remand, the district court conducted a lengthy empirical inquiry
from which it "distilled" three significant findings of fact:
1) Statistically, the Parole Commission decisions fall within the
guideline parameters in 85-90% of the cases, thus a deviation of
only 10-15%. 2) The range and contour of the individualized
decisions is relatively smooth and, for the greatest part, within
the guidelines. 3) Nominally the Parole Guidelines are discretionary but in actuality, discretion is so absent that the guidelines are revamped whenever it appears that a percentage of the
Parole Commission
decisions fall outside of the guideline pa75
rameters.
On the basis of these findings, the district court concluded that "the guidelines
are woodenly applied, thus constituting an 'unyielding conduit,' void of 'substantial flexibility,"' and concluded that "the Parole Commission Guidelines
constitute 'laws' within the meaning of the ex post facto clause."' 76 The government appealed the district court's ruling, and, in an opinion sometimes critical of his own prior decision in Forman J,177 Judge Becker reversed the district

tion of upwardly revised Parole Guidelines, subsequent opinions held that Pickus was not dispositive of the issue whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to the Parole Guidelines. See, e.g.,
Rifai v. United States, 586 F.2d 695, 698 n.5 (9th Cir. 1978) ("That the guidelines were more than
procedural guideposts for purposes of determining the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act does not elevate them to the status of 'law' within the meaning of the Ex post facto
clause. Because the guidelines are not binding on the agency, they cannot be treated as laws although they may be required to be promulgated or modified with procedural regularity." (citing
Pickus)).
172
Forman 1, 709 F.2d at 862.
173

Id.

174

Id. at 863.

175 United States ex rel. Forman v. McCall, No. 81-0553, 1984 WL 3204, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa.

Sept. 14, 1984) (quotation marks omitted).
176
Id. at *6 (quoting Forman I, 709 F.2d at 862-63).
177
United States ex rel. Forman v. McCall, 776 F.2d 1156, 1159 (3d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter
"Forman II"] (noting that Forman Ts reasoning "has since been rejected by every other circuit
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court's holding, concluding that the evidence presented to the district court "unequivocally demonstrates that the guidelines are applied with substantial flexibility. ' '178 Forman H determined that, properly interpreted, the statistical evidence examined by the district court demonstrated that "the average annual percentage of within-guideline decisions [was] 75.4%," a figure that it found to be
"strong evidence of 'substantial flexibility' in the application of the parole
guidelines."1 79 In light of this evidence, the Forman H court held that "the
guidelines are being administered with sufficient flexibility that they do not constitute 'laws' for purposes of the ex post facto clause," thereby reversing the
district court and creating a unanimous consensus among the federal courts 18of0
appeals that the Parole Guidelines are not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause.
C.

The Supreme Court's Clarificationof Ex Post Facto Methodology

In citing the Parole Guidelines cases in support of the conclusion that
Booker rendered the Ex Post Facto Clause inapplicable to the Sentencing Guidelines, Demaree neglected to acknowledge that the categorical distinction drawn
by those cases-the distinction between administrative guidelines that carry the
force of law and those that lack full legal status because the governmental entity
to which they apply has some discretion to depart from the guidelines' recommendations-was never endorsed by the Supreme Court, and was rejected by
the Court in two opinions issued after the Parole Guidelines cases were decided:
182
181
California Department of Corrections v. Morales and Garner v. Jones.
Morales held that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to administrative regulations
that provide for the exercise of discretion in their application so long as the retroactive application of the regulation at issue would create a sufficient risk of
increasing the measure of punishment imposed on the criminal defendant, 83
while Garner established a two-pronged inquiry evaluating both the formal
characteristics and the practical effects of a legislative enactment when assessing the likelihood that a given legislative enactment creates a risk of increased
84
punishment sufficient to bring it within the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause.'
Although the functional approach applied by both cases was well-established in
the Supreme Court's ex post facto jurisprudence when the Parole Guidelines
cases were decided-indeed, more than a century before the adoption of the
that has addressed the issue," but concluding that "it remains the law of this circuit until overruled
by the in banc court").
178

Id. at 1158.

179

Id.

180

Id.

181 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
182
529 U.S. 244 (2000).
183
Morales, 514 U.S. at 509.
184
Garner,529 U.S. at 254-55.
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Parole Guidelines, the Court recognized that the framers of the Ex Post Facto
Clause "intended that the rights of the citizen should be secure against deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised," and noted that "[i]f the inhibition [against ex post facto laws] can be
evaded by the form of the enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a
vain and futile proceeding"' 85-the Garner decision reiterated that principle in
the context of an ex post facto challenge to a parole statute similar, insofar as it
vested significant discretion in the relevant governmental entity to depart from
its recommendations in individual cases, to the Parole Guidelines.18 6 The Garner Court cited neither Geraghty nor Forman, but its decision is nevertheless a
vindication of the empirical approach applied by those decisions, and requires
that the same sort of empirical analysis be applied to the issue of whether the Ex
Post Facto Clause applies to the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines.
In Morales, the Court upheld the retroactive application of an amended
rule of the California Board of Prison Terms, which permitted that Board to
delay parole rehearings of prisoners convicted of multiple murders for up to
187
three years after an initial denial of parole, against an ex post facto challenge.
Morales was convicted of first-degree murder in 1971, and sentenced to life in
prison. 88 He was released into a halfway house in April 1980 and was married
shortly thereafter to a woman with whom he had corresponded while incarcerated. Mr. Morales's wife was reported missing in July 1980, and although her
body was never found, Morales pleaded nolo contendere to second-degree murder in connection with her disappearance later in 1980.189 He was sentenced to a
term of 15 years to life, and became eligible for parole in 1990.90 In July 1989,
Morales appeared before the California Board of Prison Terms for a parole hearing, at which the Board determined that Morales was unsuitable for parole for a
variety of reasons generally related to the violent nature of his crimes. 19 1 Under
the law in effect at the time Morales committed the second murder, he would
have been entitled to subsequent rehearings on an annual basis; however, in
1981, the California legislature amended the relevant rule to permit the California Board of Prison Terms to defer parole rehearings for up to three years "if the
prisoner has been convicted of 'more than one offense which involves the taking
of a life' and if the Board 'finds that it is not reasonable to expect that parole
would be granted at a hearing the following years and states the bases for the
185
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1877). Likewise, in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,
31 (1981), decided prior to many of the Parole Guidelines cases, the Court recognized that "it is
the effect, not the form, of the law that determines whether it is ex post facto."
186
Garner,529 U.S. at 252-53.
Morales, 514 U.S. at 503.
187
188
Id. at 502.

189

Id.

190

Id.

'91

Id. at 502-03.
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finding."",192 Pursuant to the amended rule, the Board scheduled Morales's next
suitability hearing for 1992, three years after his initial hearing.' 93 Morales then
filed a federal habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that
the retroactive application of the rule permitting the Board to defer his parole
rehearing violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 194 The United States District Court
for the Central District of California denied his petition, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause compelled the California Board
to grant Morales an annual rehearing for the duration of his
of Prison Terms
95
imprisonment.'
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, holding that
California's retroactive application of the revised parole rehearing rule was not
barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause. 196 The Court distinguished its prior holdings in Lindsey v. Washington,'97 Miller v. Florida,'98 and Weaver v. Graham' 99
on the ground that the legislative enactments at issue in each of those cases "had
200
the purpose and effect of enhancing the range of available prison terms,
whereas the purpose of the revised California law was simply to save resources
by permitting the California Board of Prison Terms to decline to hold annual
rehearings for prisoners with no realistic possibility of being found suitable for
parole. 20 The Court also rejected Morales's argument that the Ex Post Facto
Clause should be held to prohibit "any legislative change that has any conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner's punishment," concluding that such a broad
principle "would require that we invalidate any of a number of minor... mechanical changes that might produce some remote risk of impact on a prisoner's
expected term of confinement., 20 2 To the contrary, the Court stated that in order
to evaluate whether the retroactive application of the revised parole rehearing
rule would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, "we must determine whether it
192

Id. at 503 (quoting

193

Id.

194

Id. at 504.

CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 3041.5(b)(2) (1982)).

195 Id. (citing Morales v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 16 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 1994)).
196

Id. at 514.

197 301 U.S.397 (1937).
198
482 U.S.423 (1987); see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
199 450 U.S.24 (1981).

Morales, 514 U.S. at 508. The same is true of revised Sentencing Guidelines, which also
have the purpose and effect of extending the range of defendants' prison terms. Morales might
arguably be read, therefore, to suggest that the Sentencing Guidelines may be held subject to the
Ex Post Facto Clause without reference to the "sufficient risk" test articulated in that case. While
such an inference is not implausible on the basis of Morales and Garner, this Article shall focus
on the alternative argument that upwardly revised Sentencing Guidelines satisfy the criteria for ex
post facto laws set forth in those cases by creating a substantial risk of increased punishment to a
criminal defendant if applied retroactively.
200

201
202

Id. at 504-06.
Id.
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produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to
the covered crimes. 20 3 Applying that standard, the Court held that the revised
parole rehearing rule did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if applied retroactively, for two reasons: first, the rule applied only to prisoners incarcerated for
multiple murders, "a class of prisoners for whom the likelihood of release on
parole is quite remote, 20 4 and second, that the Board's authority to defer parole
rehearings was "carefully tailored" to increase the efficiency of the system
without adversely affecting the rights of prisoners.20 5 Specifically, the Court
noted that the Board's authority to defer rehearings was constrained by the requirement that it specifically find that the prisoner had no realistic chance of
being found suitable for parole in the intervening years, and that the revised rule
gave the Board "authority to tailor the frequency of subsequent suitability hearings to the particular circumstances of the individual prisoner," including the
specific characteristics of the underlying crimes and the prisoner's institutional
record.20 6 In light of these considerations, the Court found that the revised parole rehearing rule created "only the most speculative and attenuated possibility
of producing the prohibited effect of increasing the measure of punishment for
covered crimes," and therefore was not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto
Clause.20 7 Notably, the Court did not elicit or consider empirical evidence regarding the actual amounts of time served by prisoners subject to the revised
rule in comparison with the time served prior to the effective date of the revision
203

Id. at 509. Although Morales's "sufficient risk" language has been quoted and applied by

many subsequent courts, including the Supreme Court in Garnerv. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000), it
would be trivially tautological if interpreted literally, resulting in a rule that the Ex Post Facto
Clause applies to those legislative enactments which, if applied retroactively, create a risk of
increased punishment sufficient that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to them. In the context of
Morales and subsequent cases, it is clear that the Court intended to require a substantial risk of
increased punishment in order to invoke the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
204

Id. at 510.

205

Morales, 514 U.S. at 510-11.
Id. at 511. Demaree cited Morales's discussion of the California Board of Prison Terms's

206

discretion to individually tailor parole rehearing dates for the proposition that "the ex post facto
clause should apply only to laws and regulations that bind rather than advise, a principle well
established with reference to parole guidelines whose retroactive application is challenged under
the ex post facto clause," 459 F.3d at 795 (citing Morales, 514 U.S. at 511-13), but this interpretation is not supported by the Court's treatment of the issue in Morales. If Morales stood for the
proposition that the existence of discretion categorically exempts a legislative enactment from the
scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court could have said that more directly, and without considering the question of whether the respondent had established the existence of a sufficient risk
that the retroactive application of the rule would result in an enhanced measure of punishment. A
more plausible reading of the Court's holding in Morales is that the Board's discretion was relevant to the issue of whether a sufficient risk of increased punishment existed because the Board
was permitted to exercise its discretion to delay parole rehearings for more than one year only to
prisoners whom it determined were unlikely to be found suitable for parole within one year, and
such a practice would not be likely to result in lengthening the amount of time served by any
prisoner.
207

Morales, 514 U.S. at 509.
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in reaching its conclusion that the revised rule did not create a sufficient risk of
increasing the measure of punishment, but based its analysis solely on the text
of the rule and the Court's own intuitive understanding of its likely effects.2 °8
In Garner v. Jones, °9 the Court addressed a fact pattern and ex post
facto issue similar to that presented in Morales but took its analysis one step
further, retaining Morales's principle that a plaintiff seeking to establish an ex
post facto violation must demonstrate a sufficient risk of increased punishment
while clarifying that the determination of whether such a risk exists requires
both an examination of the formal terms of the legislative enactment at issue as
well as an evaluation of the practical effects of that enactment. 210 The regulation at issue in Garner was a rule of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles 211 regarding the frequency with which prisoners serving life sentences
were entitled to reconsideration hearings following an initial denial of parole.
Under the policy in effect at the time the respondent Robert L. Jones committed
the second of the two murders for which he was sentenced, prisoners serving
life sentences were entitled to an initial parole hearing after seven years, and to a
reconsideration hearing every three years thereafter.21 2 In 1985, while Jones
was incarcerated, the Georgia Parole Board amended the rule to provide that
reconsideration hearings for inmates serving life sentences "shall take place at
least every eight years. 21 3 Under the amended rule, the Georgia Parole Board
had the authority to schedule a reconsideration hearing at any time within a period of eight years after the initial hearing, and could, in its discretion, expedite
a previously scheduled hearing when an inmate demonstrated a change in circumstances or when the Board discovered new information relevant to its assessment of the prisoner's suitability for parole.2 14
When the Georgia Parole Board applied the new rule to Jones, scheduling his next reconsideration hearing for eight years after a hearing at which he
was found unsuitable for parole, he filed an action against the Board under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the application of the revised rule to his case violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.215 The district court granted summary judgment
to the state, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the retroactive application of the revised rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 21 6 The Eleventh
Circuit's holding rested in part on its conclusion that, when the revised rule was
applied to the large population of prisoners serving life sentences in the state of
208

Id. at 512-13.

209

529 U.S. 244 (2000).

210

Id. at 254-55.

211

Hereinafter the "Georgia Parole Board."

212

Ga. Rules & Regs., Rule 475-3-.05(2) (1979), cited in Garner,529 U.S. at 247.
Garner,529 U.S. at 247 (quoting Ga. Rules & Regs., Rule 475-3-.05(2) (1985)).
Garner,529 U.S. at 248.
Id. at 247.
Jones v. Garner, 164 F.3d 589, 595 (1 lth Cir. 1999).

213
214
215
216
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Georgia, it "seem[ed] certain that some number of inmates [would] find the
length of their incarceration extended in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the Constitution. 2 1 7
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision, holding
that "[t]he Court of Appeals' analysis failed to reveal whether the amendment..
. in its operation, created a significant risk of increased punishment for respondent., 218 The phrase "in its operation" is of special significance to the Court's
holding and to the methodology it applied. The Court began its analysis by observing that "[w]hether retroactive application of a particular change in parole
law respects the prohibition on ex post facto legislation is often a question of
particular difficulty when the discretion vested in a parole board is taken into
account,, 21 9 while emphasizing that "the presence of discretion does not displace the protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 2 2 ° Citing Morales for the
proposition that the dispositive inquiry for ex post facto purposes is whether the
revised rule creates "a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment
attached to the covered crimes,, 22 1 the Court applied a two-pronged inquiry to
determine whether the respondent had demonstrated that the retroactive application of the Georgia Parole Board's revised rule created a risk of increased punishment sufficient to bring the rule within the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
First, the Court applied a formal analysis, looking to the language of the rule to
determine whether a risk of increased punishment was evident from the text
itself.222 Finding that the formal examination of the rule did not reveal such a
risk, the Court explained that the textual analysis does not end the inquiry, noting that "[w]hen the rule does not by its own terms show a significant risk, the
respondent must demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule's practical implementation ... that its retroactive application will result in a longer period of
incarceration than under the earlier rule. 223 The Court held that Jones had not
carried his burden on that point, having provided insufficient empirical evidence
about the Georgia Parole Board's implementation of the revised rule to permit
the Court to assess whether the application of the rule to Jones's case created a
sufficient risk of enhanced punishment.22 4 The court therefore remanded the
case to permit the lower courts to consider whether to grant Jones additional
discovery so as to further develop the factual record
necessary to satisfy the
225
empirical prong of the Court's ex post facto inquiry.
217

Id.

218
219

Garner,529 U.S. at 257.
Id. at 250.

220

Id. at 253.

221

Id. at 250 (quoting United States v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995)).

222

224

Id. at 252-53, 256.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 256.

225

Id. at 257.

223
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Although Jones was unable to carry his evidentiary burden with respect
to the ex post facto issue presented in his case, the Garner Court's clear articulation of a two-pronged ex post facto inquiry that requires examining both the
formal characteristics and the practical effects of a legislative enactment unequivocally demonstrates that the categorical distinction between enactments
that "bind" and those that merely "advise," which Demaree and the Parole
Guidelines cases found to be of dispositive significance, is simply not recognized by the Constitution as a basis for distinguishing those legislative enactments to which the Ex Post Facto Clause applies from those to which it does
not. The Demaree court was aware of Garner,but its treatment of the case suggests that the Seventh Circuit failed to grasp the significance of the Supreme
Court's decision. Demaree cited Garner for the proposition that "the ex post
facto clause should apply only to laws and regulations that bind rather than advise, 226 but failed to recognize that Garnerrejected the categorical approach on
which that distinction rests. It was undisputed in Garnerthat the revised parole
rule at issue gave the Georgia Parole Board discretion to hold a parole reconsideration hearing more frequently than every eight years, but the Court expressly
rejected the argument that the Board's discretion to depart from the revised rule
was sufficient to remove the revised parole statute from the scope of the Ex Post
Facto Clause.227
Subsequent appellate decisions have recognized that the bright-line distinction between "law" and "not law" upon which the Parole Guidelines cases
relied was rejected by Morales and Garner,and that where an ex post facto violation is not apparent on the face of the legislative enactment at issue, Garner
requires courts to take the additional step of empirically examining the extent to
which the enactment actually influences the exercise of discretion by the governmental entity to which it applies in order to determine whether its retroactive
application creates a substantial risk of increasing the measure of punishment
imposed on the defendant above the level that would have applied under the law
in effect at the time the offense was committed. For example, in Michael v.
Ghee, the Sixth Circuit recognized that Garner implicitly overruled its decision
in Ruip,228 holding that "Ruip should no longer be followed because it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Garner v. Jones.' 229 Michael in226
227

459 F.3d at 795 (citing Garner, 529 U.S. at 256).
Garner, 529 U.S. at 253 (recognizing that "the presence of discretion does not displace the

protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause . . ."). Demaree also ignored the fact that the Florida
parole guidelines held subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause in Miller v. Florida likewise granted
the sentencing court some discretion to depart in cases where the court found clear and convincing
evidence of aggravating or mitigating factors. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
228 Ruip v. United States, 555 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1977); see supra note 139 and accompanying
text.
229 Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007). The Sixth Circuit has long recognized the
significance of Garner,though it did not acknowledge that case's implicit overruling of Ruip until
its decision in Michael. For example, in Dyer v. Bowlen, 465 F.3d 280, 288-89 (6th Cir. 2006),
the court discussed Morales and Garnerextensively in the context of an ex post facto challenge to
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volved an ex post facto challenge to parole guidelines adopted by the Ohio
Adult Parole Authority 230 in 1998 that were made retroactively applicable to
inmates sentenced prior to July 1, 1996.231 The Ohio guidelines functioned in a
manner similar to the federal Parole Guidelines, in that the inmate's presumptive term of incarceration was determined by locating the intersection on a grid
of two numeric scores reflecting the seriousness of the offense and the likelihood that the offender could be safely released; significantly, like the Parole
Commission, OAPA "retain[ed] discretion to depart from the guidelines" in
appropriate circumstances. 232 A group of inmates filed an action against OAPA
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which they argued that retroactive application of the
1998 parole guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.233 The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants, citing Ruip for the proposition
that the parole guidelines at issue were not laws, and therefore were not subject
to the Ex Post Facto Clause.234 In the alternative, the district court held that
even if the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to the parole guidelines, the defendants
the retroactive application of two statutes governing the Tennessee parole board's decisionmaking
process that were not in effect when the appellant's crime was committed, and remanded the case
"with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the practical effects of the statutes' retroactive application ... because Garner requires an inmate to demonstrate a sufficient risk of increased punishment that is either inherent on the face of the new statutes or is evidenced by the
statutes' practical implementation." Numerous earlier unpublished Sixth Circuit opinions recognize the same principles. See, e.g., Kilbane v. Kinkela, 24 F. App'x 241, 243 (6th Cir. 2001)
(affirming dismissal of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging retroactive application of Ohio Parole
Guidelines on the ground that "[t]he Ohio regulations by their own terms do not show a significant
risk of increased punishment for prisoners generally .... Furthermore, the plaintiffs merely presented conclusory allegations and provided no evidence that the new guidelines have diminished
the possibility of release for persons like themselves .... (citing Garner)); Fraser v. Tennessee
Bd. of Paroles, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) ("The question is
whether retroactive application of the change in law creates a sufficient risk of increasing the
measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes. When the rule does not by its own terms
demonstrate a significant risk, the prisoner challenging the retroactive application of the amendment must demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule's practical implementation, that its retroactive application will result in a longer period of incarceration than under the earlier rule." (citing
Garner)).
230

Hereinafter "OAPA."

231

Prior to July 1, 1996, Ohio utilized an indeterminate sentencing system in which the sen-

tencing court would impose a minimum and maximum sentence, with the decision of precisely
how much time within that range the defendant would actually serve left to OAPA. Michael, 498
F.3d at 373-74. In 1995, Ohio adopted legislation, effective as of July 1, 1996, that "abandoned
[indeterminate sentences] in favor of fixed terms of incarceration determined by the defendant's
presiding judge." Id. at 374 (citing OHIo REv. CODE § 5120 et seq.). This legislation abolished
the parole system for all defendants sentenced after that date, but because it was not retroactive,
OAPA continued to conduct parole hearings for defendants sentenced under the indeterminate
sentencing system that was in effect prior to the effective date of the new legislation. See Michael, 498 F.3d at 373-74.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 374.
234

See id. at 380-81.
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were entitled to summary judgment because the retroactive application of the
1998 parole guidelines would not "create a sufficient risk of increasing the
measure of punishment attached to the underlying crime. 235 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the basis of the district court's alternative holding, but held that the district court's reliance on Ruip was mis236 Michael identi
placed because that opinion was irreconcilable with Garner.
fied three aspects of Garner's holding as inconsistent with prior Sixth Circuit
jurisprudence: first, contrary to the Sixth Circuit's holding in Ruip, "the [Garner] Court made clear that guidelines that affect discretion, rather than mandate
outcomes, are nevertheless subject to ex post facto scrutiny" ;237 second, Garner
involved an ex post facto challenge to regulations issued by a state administrative agency rather than by the legislature, and therefore implicitly held that administrative regulations are not categorically exempt from the purview of the Ex
Post Facto Clause; 238 and third, Garner contravened prior Sixth Circuit authority, which had held that the retroactive application of revised parole guidelines
to a prisoner serving a life term could not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it could not extend the duration of the prisoner's sentence beyond the period to which the prisoner was originally sentenced, 239 by remanding for discovery on the issue whether the Georgia Parole Board's revised rule created a significant risk of increasing the actual amount of time that Jones would actually be
required to serve, notwithstanding the fact that the rule could not have the effect
of extending his sentence beyond the maximum term of life to which he was
originally sentenced.24 ° Synthesizing these three aspects of the Supreme Court's
ruling, Michael held that "[a]fter Garner, the relevant inquiry, therefore, is not
whether the challenged parole regulation is a 'law' or whether the guidelines
present a significant risk of increasing the plaintiffs maximum penalty, but
rather whether the new guidelines present24 a1 significant risk of increasing the
plaintiffs amount of time actually served.",
In addition to its discussion of the Garner opinion itself, Michael also
relied on the D.C. Circuit's opinions in Fletcher v. District of Columbia242 and

236

Id. at 380.
Id. at 382.

237

Id. (citing Garner, 529 U.S. at 253).

238

Id.

239

Id. (citing Hunt v. Wilkinson, 79 F. App'x 861, 862 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Hunt was sentenced..

235

.to life in prison, consecutive to other terms of imprisonment, with the possibility of a discretionary grant of parole. The new regulations, which may increase the periods between parole hearings,
and do not give Hunt a projected release date, do nothing to increase the punishment to which
Hunt was originally sentenced.")).
240
See id. at 380-82.
241
Id. at 383.
242
391 F.3d 250 (D.C. Cir. 2004) [hereinafter "FletcherIT'].
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its successor, Fletcher v. Reilly,243 in support of its conclusion that Garner implicitly overruled Ruip. The first opinion in the Fletcher series, 244 which Chief
Judge Ginsburg wrote for a unanimous panel including then-Judge John Roberts, relied on the D.C. Circuit's pre-Garner Parole Guidelines decisions as
grounds for affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's ex post facto challenge to
the retroactive application of the federal reparole guidelines, holding that "a
parole guideline is not a 'law' within the proscription of the Ex Post Facto
Clause." 245 The plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing which called the court's
attention to Garner, and in Fletcher II, the same panel unanimously vacated its
decision in Fletcher I, holding that Garner "foreclosed our categorical distinction between a measure with the force of law and 'guidelines [that] are merely
246
policy statements from which the Commission may depart in its discretion.'
Fletcher II recognized that, after Garner, the dispositive question for ex post
facto purposes is "one of practical effect," and remanded the case to the district
court "for further proceedings consistent with Garner."247 In Fletcher III, the
court reaffirmed its decision in Fletcher II, recognizing that "under Garner v.
Jones, the critical question in ex post facto challenges to retroactively applied
parole/reparole regulations is whether, as a practical matter, the retroactive ap248
plication creates a significant risk of prolonging an inmate's incarceration.,
The FletcherIII court also described the district court's conclusion that the exercise of discretion removed the Parole Commission's reparole guidelines from
Fletcher v. Reilly, 433 F.3d 867, 868-73 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter "FletcherII']. The
National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 transferred responsibility for offenders convicted under the District of Columbia Code [hereinafter "D.C.
Code"] from the District of Columbia Board of Parole [hereinafter "D.C. Board"] to the United
States Parole Commission. At issue in the Fletcher series of opinions was the plaintiff's ex post
facto challenge to the Parole Commission's application of its own reparole guidelines, which did
not formally take into account his post-incarceration efforts at rehabilitation, to Fletcher's reparole
hearing, instead of the D.C. Board's reparole regulations, which did consider post-incarceration
rehabilitation. Fletcher, who was convicted under the D.C. Code in 1980 and whose parole was
revoked in 1998, argued that, by failing to take his rehabilitation into account, application of the
Parole Commission's reparole guidelines to his case created a substantial risk of increasing the
length of time he would serve prior to reparole beyond the time he would have served under the
D.C. Board's guidelines. Fletcher III was not an appeal following remand in Fletcher II, but
rather an appeal in a related case filed by the same plaintiff which presented the same ex post
facto argument as a petition for habeas corpus rather than as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. See id.at
874-75.
244
Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 370 F.3d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 2004) [hereinafter "Fletcher1"].
245
Id. at 1228 (citing Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1049 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Warren
v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 197 n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
246
Fletcher I, 391 F.3d at 251 (quoting Fletcher1, 370 F.3d at 1228) (alteration in original).
247
Id.
248
Fletcher III, 433 F.3d at 869-70 (internal citations omitted). Judge Roberts, having been
appointed Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, was not a member of the FletcherIII
panel. He was replaced by Senior Circuit Judge Harry Edwards, who wrote the Fletcher III opinion.
243
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the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause as a "misconception," holding that after
Garner, "[t]he labels 'regulation' and 'guideline' are not determinative. And
the existence of discretion is not dispositive." 249 The court therefore remanded
the case to the district court in order to conduct an empirical inquiry pursuant to
Garner and Fletcher II for the purpose of determining whether the Parole
Commission's application of the federal reparole regulations "created a significant risk that [Fletcher] will be subjected to a lengthier incarceration than he
if the Commission had adhered to the rules and practices of the
would have been
250
D.C. Board.,
In addition to Michael and the Fletcher series, a number of other appellate court cases have likewise recognized the "highly fact intensive" nature of
the ex port facto analysis applied by Garner,2 5' and one district court has applied Garner and Fletcher to hold that the Ex Post Facto Clause bars the retroactive application of post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines when that application
would increase the defendant's sentencing range, expressly rejecting the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Demaree. In United States v. Restrepo-Suares,252 the
court addressed a federal prisoner's petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to
vacate his sentence of 72 months' imprisonment on the ground that the court
incorrectly applied the upwardly revised Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the
time of the petitioner's sentencing in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Restrepo-Suares had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to import, manufacture, and
distribute cocaine, an offense that was ongoing from January 1994 to January
2004. At his sentencing on January 31, 2007, the court applied the 2006 Guidelines Manual, which provided for a sentencing range of 70 to 87 months. In his
section 2255 petition, Restrepo-Suares argued that the court should have applied

250

Id. at 876.
Id. at 879.

251

Olstad v. Collier, 205 F. App'x 308, 310 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the district court's sua

249

sponte dismissal of the appellant's ex post facto challenge to the retroactive application of revised
Texas parole statutes was an abuse of discretion in light of the statistical evidence that the appellant submitted in his objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation that purportedly demonstrated the substantial risk of increased punishment to which he would be exposed by
retroactive application of the statutes at issue); see also Richardson v. Pa. Bd. of Probation and
Parole, 423 F.3d 282, 293 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying Garner test, affirming dismissal of plaintiff
prisoner's challenge to retroactive application of 1996 amendments to Pennsylvania Parole Act
where the plaintiff "has not provided any ... evidence of disadvantage as a result of the 1996
Amendments"); Henderson v. Scott, 260 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying two-pronged
Garner analysis to prisoner's ex post facto challenge to Oklahoma law extending time between
initial parole hearing and rehearing, but dismissing appeal and denying certificate of appealability
because "Mr. Henderson has not shown that the Oklahoma statute, as amended, will have the
effect of prolonging his punishment either on the face of the statute or as applied to his specific
circumstances"). But see Warren v. Baskerville, 233 F.3d 204, 208 (4th Cir. 2000) (post-Garner
decision holding that revised parole policy affecting accumulated good time credit was not subject
to the Ex Post Facto Clause because Virginia Parole Board's Policy Manual "did not for ex post
facto purposes have the force and effect of law").
252 516 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2007).
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the 2003 Guidelines Manual, in effect at the time the conspiracy of which he
was convicted was completed, which would have indicated a sentencing range
of 46 to 57 months. Addressing the petitioner's argument, the court first noted
the "divergent views on whether the Guidelines, now 'advisory,' present the
same [ex post facto] problem [that was universally recognized prior to Booker],"
briefly contrasting the Seventh Circuit's decision in Demaree with the decisions
in Safavian, Kingsbury, and United States v. Kandirakis 3 However, the court
observed that while those cases "are useful in describing the nature of the disadvantage suffered by a defendant under even an advisory Guidelines regime...
they do not squarely confront the threshold issue of whether a non-binding
guideline can . . . present an ex post facto violation., 254 In resolving this
"threshold" question, the district court relied on Garner and the D.C. Circuit's
Fletcherseries to conclude that "in this Circuit at least, an advisory guideline is
not exempt from ex post facto analysis simply because of its non-binding
status," rejecting Demaree's holding to the contrary as "squarely at odds with
the Fletcher cases. .. .,,255 The court then noted that, having concluded that the
post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines remain subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause
as a general matter, it "still must consider whether application of the 2006
Guidelines would result in an ex post facto violation based on the 'significant
risk' standard articulated in Garner and the Fletcher cases" in order to determine whether the retroactive application of the 2006 Guidelines was barred by
the Ex Post Facto Clause in Restrepo-Suares's case.256 Relying primarily on the
Sentencing Commission's statistical data that is discussed at length in Part IV.B
below, which indicates a very high rate of conformity with the Guidelines' "advisory" recommendations in the post-Booker era, the court concluded that the
retroactive application of the 2006 Guidelines did create a significant risk of
imposing a greater measure of punishment on the petitioner than would have
been the case under the 2003 Guidelines; the court also noted the formal aspects
of the post-Booker sentencing structure that would contribute to such a risk,
including the fact that "sentencing courts remain obligated to calculate and consider the appropriate guidelines range," and that the Guidelines are intended to
Id. at 116 (citing United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 3055 (2007); United States v. Safavian, 461 F. Supp. 2d 76, 82-83 (D.D.C. 2006);
United States v. Kingsbury, No. CR-05-51-B-W, 2006 WL 2575484, at *3 (D. Me. Sept. 1, 2006);
United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 335 (D. Mass. 2006)); see supra note 101 (discussing Kingsbury); 107 (discussing Safavian) In Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 335 (D. Mass.
2006), the district court invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to apply the Guidelines
range in effect at the time the defendant's offense was committed, but noted that "were the Guidelines truly 'advisory,' Kandirakis's argument would lose much of its force, as the Court could
fashion an individualized sentence based on the best sociological and penological data known to it
at the time of sentence." 441 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
254 Restrepo-Suares,516 F. Supp. 2d. at 116-17.
255
Id. at 117.
253

256

Id.
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represent a reasonable application of the section 3553(a) factors in the majority
of cases.257 Ultimately, the court concluded that
[i]n light of the empirical data indicating that a clear majority of
sentences fall within the Guidelines range, the legal precedent
giving the Guidelines range a prominent role in determining the
proper sentence, and this Court's own practice of giving some
weight to the Guidelines range and often sentencing within that
range, the Court concludes that application of the revised 2006
Guidelines ...

instead of the 2003 Guidelines, would create a

significant risk of a longer period of incarceration, and thus
would violate the ex post facto clause. Therefore, pursuant to
[U.S.S.G.] § 1BI.1 l(b)(1), the Court holds that defendant is entitled to resentencing based on an advisory Guidelines range determined under the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that
the offense was committed-that is, the 2003 Guidelines.258
The court therefore granted Restrepo-Suares's section 2255 petition and vacated
his sentence pending resentencing pursuant to the 2003 Guidelines.25 9
IV. APPLICATION OF THE GARNER INQUIRY TO THE POST-BOOKER SENTENCING
GUIDELINES

Had Demaree and the opinions endorsing its reasoning considered Garner's instruction to examine not only the technical form of the Sentencing
Guidelines, but also their practical effects on sentencing outcomes, as carefully
as the district court in Restrepo-Suares did, they might have reached a different
conclusion about the Ex Post Facto Clause's continued applicability to the
Guidelines. However, even the purely formal methodology that Demaree applied should have persuaded the Seventh Circuit that the retroactive application
of upwardly revised post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines would violate the principles underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause in more than a pejoratively "literal"
way. Two formal aspects of post-Booker reasonableness review-the presumption of reasonableness of within-Guidelines sentences and extent-of-thevariance review-operate in a manner such that the location of a defendant's
Id. at 118 (quoting United States v. Ventura, 481 F.3d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). The
court further noted that "it is the practice of this Court always to consider the Guidelines range
and generally to impose a sentence within the Guidelines range, absent adequate grounds for a
departure," which the court described as an "infrequent occurrence ... for the simple reason acknowledged in Rita-the Guidelines are designed to reflect [the section 3553(a)] factors, and ...
257

the Guidelines typically achieve that goal."
(2007)).
258 Id. at 118-19 (footnote omitted).
259 Id. at 119.
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sentence vis-A-vis the Guidelines range makes a real, and at times dispositive,
difference in whether the sentence is affirmed on appeal or reversed as unreasonable. While the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Rita and Gall may affect the manner in which these formal aspects of substantive reasonableness
review are applied in the future, those opinions provide no reason to expect that
the circuit courts' adherence to the Guidelines as benchmarks for substantive
reasonableness will relax to the extent that the retroactive application of upwardly revised Guidelines will no longer create a substantial risk of greater punishment to the defendant. Moreover, post-Booker sentencing statistics clearly
reveal that in the vast majority of cases, district courts continue to sentence defendants within the Guidelines range, and appellate courts are far more deferential to within-Guidelines sentences than to variances. Taken together, the formal
characteristics and empirical realities of post-Booker sentencing demonstrate
that the Sentencing Guidelines remain a powerful influence on sentencing
courts' decisions, such that the retroactive application of upwardly revised Sentencing Guidelines inevitably creates a substantial risk of greater punishment for
criminal defendants.
A.

FormalAspects of Post-BookerAppellate Review

In the years since Booker, most of the federal courts of appeals have applied reasonableness review in ways that, in the words of Senior Judge Graham
Mullen of the Western District of North Carolina and J.P. Davis, render the
Guidelines "effectively mandatory., 260 Mullen and Davis identify two features
of post-Booker appellate review-the presumption of reasonableness and extent-of-variance review-that they argue undermine the spirit of Booker's holding, thereby "resurrect[ing]" the pre-Booker system of mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines "to stalk our jurisprudence once more., 261 Because they have the
effect of pushing federal sentencing back toward the pre-Booker, mandatoryGuidelines model, those same features demonstrate that under the post-Booker
sentencing scheme that has been approved by the Supreme Court, an upward
revision of the Sentencing Guidelines creates a sufficiently substantial risk of
increased punishment to warrant the continued application of the Ex Post Facto
Clause to the Guidelines, notwithstanding their theoretically advisory nature in
the post-Booker paradigm.
The first aspect of post-Booker appellate review discussed by Mullen
and Davis, the presumption of reasonableness, has been adopted by seven federal circuits-the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Cir260

Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State of Sentenc-

ing After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REv. 625, 648 (2007); cf United States v.
Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 334 n.78 (D. Mass. 2006) (observing that the Sentencing Guidelines are "functionally near-mandatory" under the circuit courts' interpretation of post-Booker
reasonableness review).
261 Mullen & Davis, supra note 260, at 625.
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while the First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected it. 263 Under this rule, an appellate court reviewing a sentence that falls
within the Guidelines range applies a theoretically rebuttable presumption that
the within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable with respect to all of
the section 3553(a) factors. Mullen and Davis argue that the presumption effectively eliminates the need for independent examination of the other section
3553(a) factors; "at the absolute most, [the sentencing judge] is required to state
that he has considered the factors in § 3553(a) with no further elaboration," 26
cuits- -

262

See id. at 633 & n.43 (citing United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006)),
636 & n.70 (citing United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kristl,
437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir.
2006)).
263
See United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir.
2006); United States v. Zavala, 443 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hunt, 459
F.3d 1180, 1185 (1 lth Cir. 2006).
Mullen and Davis classify Jimenez-Beltre as a case "tacitly enforc[ing]" the presumption of
reasonableness, but this characterization does not appear well-founded in light of Jimenez-Beltre 's
language and holding. Mullen & Davis, supra note 260, at 636 & n.71. Mullen and Davis rest
their characterization of Jimenez-Beltre on the basis of the court's comment that "the guidelines
cannot be called just 'another factor' in the statutory list ...because they are the only integration
of the multiple factors and, with important exceptions, their calculations were based upon the
actual sentences of many judges." Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518, cited in Mullen & Davis,
supra note 260, at 636 n.71. However, the court went on to recognize in the next paragraph that
"the guidelines are still generalizationsthat can point to outcomes that may appear unreasonable
to sentencing judges in particular cases," and ultimately approved of the district court's sentencing
procedure, which involved "sequential[ly] determin[ing] ... the guideline range, including any
proposed departures, followed by the further determination whether other factors identified by
either side warrant an ultimate sentence above or below the guideline range." Jimenez-Beltre, 440
F.3d at 518-19 (citations omitted). The court then affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's requested downward variances as reasonable. Placing the language cited by Mullen and
Davis in context, it does not appear that Jimenez-Beltre was technically rejecting the presumption
of reasonableness while actually applying the same standard; rather, the court seems to be simply
acknowledging the unique nature of the Guidelines with respect to the other § 3553(a) factors,
while applying a broad standard of review weighing the reasonableness of the sentence without
bestowing a presumption of reasonableness upon the Guidelines.
Mullen and Davis's assertion that the Third Circuit also "tacitly enforced" a presumption of
reasonableness in Cooper is equally implausible. Mullen & Davis, supra note 260, at 636 & n.71.
Like Jimenez-Beltre, Cooper explicitly declined to adopt a presumption of reasonableness.
Though it acknowledged that "a within-guidelines range sentence is more likely to be reasonable
than one that lies outside the advisory guidelines range," 437 F.3d at 331, the court made clear
that it based that assertion simply on the fact that "[tihe federal sentencing guidelines represent the
collective determination of three governmental bodies--Congress, the Judiciary, and the Sentencing Commission-as to the appropriate punishments for a wide range of criminal conduct," id.at
331 n.10, and immediately followed its statement with the observation that "a within-guidelines
sentence is not necessarily reasonable per se," concluding that to hold otherwise "would come
close to restoring the mandatory nature of the guidelines excised in Booker." Id. at 331.
Mullen & Davis, supra note 260, at 633.
264
262

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008

47

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 6

1080

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. IllO

though some authority suggests that not even a pro forma invocation of the other
factors is necessary to affirm a within-Guidelines sentence as reasonable when
the presumption is applied. 265 Although the presumption of reasonableness is
technically rebuttable, "[a] defendant can only rebut the presumption [that] a
properly calculated Guidelines range is reasonable 'by demonstrating that the
266
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors,'
which gives the hypothetical possibility of rebutting the presumption an air of
practical futility in light of the courts' rather circular assumption that "sentences
within guidelines range are presumptively reasonable in part due to incorporation of § 3553(a) factors into the guidelines., 267 Even Judge McConnell of the
Tenth Circuit has conceded that "the rebuttability of the presumption is more
theoretical than real. 2 68 Mullen and Davis argue that the application of the presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences has reintroduced "a
mandatory Guidelines system with greater ground for departure . . . than be-

fore,, 269 adding that for practical purposes, "absolutely nothing has changed"
since the Booker decision, as "[i]n the average, 27
run-of-the-mill
case, the Sen0
tencing Guidelines are just as mandatory as ever.,
265

See United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that district courts

are not "obligated to conduct a § 3553(a) roll call," in part because "[m]any of the § 3553(a) factors are already incorporated into any Guidelines determination..."). As discussed below, the
Supreme Court's decision in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007), held that the sentencing court is required to provide a statement of the reasons underlying its sentencing decision even
when imposing a within-Guidelines sentence, though that statement may be brief. See infra note
281 and accompanying text.
266
United States v. Hegmon, 233 F. App'x 288, 289 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006)).
267
United States v. Davis, 233 F. App'x 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Johnson, 445 F.3d at
342-43).
268
United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1166 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring).
269
Mullen & Davis, supra note 260, at 640.
270 Id. at 641. It is noteworthy that federal sentencing under the presumption of reasonableness
bears a striking resemblance to the Florida sentencing scheme examined by the Supreme Court in
Miller v. Florida,482 U.S. 423 (1987), which the Court found to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause
if applied retroactively. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. In Miller, the Florida sentencing guidelines provided a "presumptive" sentencing range from which the sentencing judge could
depart only upon finding "'clear and convincing reasons to warrant aggravating or mitigating the
sentence,"' and permitted appellate review only of sentences outside the guidelines range. 482
U.S. at 426 (quoting FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.701(d)(1 1) (1983)). The Supreme Court held that the
retroactive application of upwardly revised sentencing guidelines under Florida's system violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause because defendants were "substantially disadvantaged" by the likelihood
of receiving a greater sentence, notwithstanding the fact that the court had some discretion to
depart in individual cases, and because, whereas an upward departure could have been challenged
on appeal, the imposition of a within-guidelines sentence under a retroactively-enhanced guidelines range could not. Id. at 427. Likewise, under the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines in a
circuit that has adopted the presumption of reasonableness, a defendant is adversely affected when
she is sentenced under a retroactively-enhanced Guidelines range that enjoys the presumption of
reasonableness that an upward variance would not. This observation belies Demaree's suggestion
that the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines "would
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The Supreme Court approved the application of the presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences in Rita v. United States, but held
that the presumption could be applied only by the appellate court reviewing a
sentence, and not by the district court in lieu of an independent examination of
the section 3553(a) factors.27 ' In Rita, the petitioner was convicted of perjury
and several lesser offenses in connection with his false statements to federal
agents investigating the illegal importation of machine gun kits by a corporation
from which Mr. Rita had purchased such a kit.272 At sentencing, Rita argued for
a downward variance from his Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months because of
his poor physical condition, his vulnerability in prison as a former law enforcement official, and his status as a 25-year military veteran, but the district court
rejected those arguments, sentencing him to a period of incarceration of 33
months. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit applied the presumption of reasonableness to Rita's within-Guidelines sentence and concluded that Rita's special circumstances did not make the sentence unreasonable.27 3
The Supreme Court granted Rita's petition for certiorari and affirmed
both the Fourth Circuit's practice of applying the presumption of reasonableness
to within-Guidelines sentences and its conclusion that Rita's sentence was reasonable. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, reasoned that because the Sentencing Guidelines "seek to embody the § 3553(a) considerations, both in principle and in practice ... it is fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)'s
objectives," 274 and concluded that when both the sentencing court and the
Commission arrive at the same outcome after applying the section 3553(a) factors, "[t]hat double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the
sentence is a reasonable one., 275 The majority rejected the concerns raised in
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion 276 that the presumption of reasonableness

have in the long run a purely semantic effect." United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th
Cir. 2006). Even if it is true that "[a] judge is certainly entitled to take advice from the Sentencing
Commission" by taking into account the fact that the Commission has increased the advisory
sentence for the crime of which a defendant is committed, the fact remains that an upward variance on that basis would not be entitled to a presumption of reasonableness on appeal. Id. Because the available statistics clearly indicate that sentencing courts are more deferential to withinGuidelines sentences than to upward variances, this distinction is far from "semantic." Id.; see
infra Part IV.B.
272

127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
Id. at 2460.

273

Id. at 2462; see United States v. Rita, 177 F. App'x 357 (4th Cir. 2006).

271

Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
Id. at 2463.
276
See id. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The Court
has reintroduced the constitutional defect that Booker purported to eliminate .... If a sentencing
system is permissible in which some sentences cannot lawfully be imposed by a judge unless the
judge finds certain facts by a preponderance of the evidence, then we should have left in place the
274
275
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threatened to reintroduce mandatory sentencing enhancements on the basis of
judge-found facts not proven to a jury or admitted by the defendant-the constitutional defect that motivated the Court's rulings in Apprendi,2 7 Blakely,278 and
Booker 279-on the ground that, because the sentencing court is free to sentence
the defendant to any length of time within the statutory range, post-Booker reasonableness review does not implicate the Sixth Amendment concerns identified
in those cases. 2 80 The Court next held that the district court's statement of reasons for the sentence imposed was "brief but legally sufficient" under section
3553(a), reasoning that although the judge "might have said more" in response
to Mr. Rita's arguments, "context and the record make clear" that the sentencing
court "thought the Commission in the Guidelines had determined a sentence that
was proper in the minerun of roughly similar perjury cases; and that he found
that Rita's personal circumstances here were simply not different enough to
warrant a different sentence., 281 Finally, the Court concluded that Rita's sentence was substantively reasonable, holding that "we simply cannot say that
Rita's special circumstances are special enough that, in light of § 3553(a), they
require a sentence lower than the sentence the Guidelines provide. 28 2
The Rita majority conceded that "Rita may be correct that the presumption will encourage sentencing judges to impose Guidelines sentences," but asserted that "we do not see how that fact could change the constitutional calculus. '283 For purposes of the "constitutional calculus" applicable to the Sixth
Amendment issues raised in Rita, the Court may be correct, and that question is
in any event beyond the scope of this Article. However, the fact that the presumption of reasonableness "may" encourage within-Guidelines sentencesincluding conformity to enhanced sentencing ranges if upwardly revised Guidelines are applied retroactively-is of paramount importance to the ex post facto
analysis applied by Garner. As discussed in Part IV.B, statistical evidence from
the post-Booker periods both prior to and immediately following the Rita decicompulsory Guidelines that Congress enacted, instead of imposing this jerry-rigged scheme of our
own.").
277
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); see supranote 36 and accompanying text.
278 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
279
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see supranote 35 and accompanying text.
280
Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2466.
281 Id. at 2469. Whether this is tantamount to a requirement that Guidelines variances be justified by a more detailed rationale than within-Guidelines sentences is not clearly addressed by the
Rita opinion, though that inference could reasonably be drawn from the Court's explanation that a
within-Guidelines sentence "will not necessarily require a lengthy explanation," because
"[c]ircumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission's
own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence ... in the typical case," whereas
when "the judge imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines, the judge will explain why he has
done so." Id. at 2468.
282
Id. at 2470.
283
Id. at 2467.
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sion indicates that district courts in circuits applying the presumption of reasonableness are even more likely than other districts to sentence defendants within
the Guidelines range. Whether that trend will continue now that Rita has clarified the scope of reasonableness review and the effect of the presumption of
reasonableness remains to be seen, as several themes run through the Rita opinions that, if taken seriously by the lower courts, may mitigate the likelihood that
the application of the presumption of reasonableness to retroactively-applied
Guidelines revisions will create a substantial risk of increased punishment. For
example, both the majority and Justice Stevens's concurring opinion emphasize
that the presumption of reasonableness is not conclusive of the substantive reasonableness of a within-Guidelines sentence. Justice Breyer's majority opinion
notes that the presumption of reasonableness is "not binding ' 284 and lacks "independent legal effect," but "simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that
when the judge's discretionary decision accords with the Commission's view of
the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable
that the sentence is reasonable., 285 Likewise, Justice Stevens's concurring opinion emphasizes the point that "the rebuttability of the presumption [of reasonableness] is real," and notes his "trust that those judges who had treated the
Guidelines as virtually mandatory during the post-Booker interregnum will now
recognize that the Guidelines are truly advisory. 286 Moreover, the Rita majority reiterated that the presumption of reasonableness "is an appellate court presumption," reminding the lower courts that "the sentencing court does not enjoy
the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply"
when determining the defendant's sentence in the first instance, 287 and empha-

285

Id. at 2463.
Id. at 2465.

286

Id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 2478 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in part

284

and concurring in the judgment) (noting that Justice Souter's desire to assure sentencing courts
"that the entire sentencing range set by statute is available to them" is "a proper goal-indeed, an
essential one..."). However, as discussed below, statistical evidence from the period after Rita
indicates that the Court's exhortation that sentencing courts should be less deferential to the Sentencing Guidelines made virtually no difference in the courts' rate of compliance with the Guidelines' recommendations. See infra Part IV.B.
287
Id. at 2465 (majority opinion). Rita's conclusion that the presumption of reasonableness
applies only at the level of appellate review is consistent with the manner in which the presumption has been applied in the appellate courts. See, e.g., United States v. Gama-Gonzalez, 469 F.3d
1109, 1110 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.) ("To say that a sentence within the range presumptively is reasonable is not to say that district judges ought to impose sentences within the range. It
is only to say that, if the district judge does use the Guidelines, then the sentence is unlikely to be
problematic." (citing United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2006))); United
States v. Pickett, 475 F.3d 1347, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding that although the appellate
court may presume the reasonableness of a within-Guidelines sentence, "[a] sentencing judge
cannot simply presume that a Guidelines sentence is the correct sentence. To do so would be to
take a large step in the direction of returning to the pre-Booker regime" (footnote omitted)); see
also United States v. Tucker, 232 F. App'x 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the district
court's statement that it must presume the Guidelines sentence to be reasonable was "not correct.
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sized that even where the presumption of reasonableness is applied, "appellate
courts may not288presume that every variance from the advisory Guidelines is
unreasonable.,
Although Rita may change the manner in which the presumption of reasonableness is applied in the future, Mullen and Davis persuasively argue that
the appellate courts' insistence that the pre-Rita presumption of reasonableness
did not equate to a presumption of unreasonableness as to Guidelines variances
was "demonstrably false., 289 They point out that when the presumption of reasonableness applied, "the burden [was] on the defendant ...[to provide] facts
demonstrating that a Guidelines sentence would be unreasonable," and that
"without affirmative factual evidence that a Guidelines sentence would be unreasonable and a detailed list of reasons supporting that determination, the sen290
tencing court [could not] impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range,1
concluding that "[i]f this does not qualify as a presumption against an outsideof-Guidelines sentence, it is unclear what such a presumption would look
like."2 9' While it is too early to tell whether the Court's admonitions in Rita will
cause the lower courts to show less deference to the Guidelines than has thus far
been the case, the formal presumption of reasonableness unquestionably creates
a "gravitational pull" '292 toward the Guidelines range. If the appellate courts
continue to apply the presumption of reasonableness in the same manner in
which it was applied prior to Rita, it is difficult to imagine how the increased
risk-indeed, the substantial likelihood-of greater punishment where upwardly
revised Guidelines are retroactively applied is not built directly into the appellate review system.
The second aspect of post-Booker sentencing that Mullen and Davis
identify as responsible for the de facto reintroduction of mandatory Guidelines
sentencing is "extent-of-the-variance review," pursuant to which an appellate
court treats the Guidelines range as a benchmark against which sentencing
courts are required to articulate increasingly compelling justifications for departure. In other words, "the farther the judge's sentence departs from the guideThe district court is not permitted to presume that a sentence within the Guidelines range is correct").
Of course, it is highly implausible that sentencing courts will not be at all influenced by the
knowledge that a within-Guidelines sentence will be treated as presumptively reasonable on appeal, while a sentence that falls outside the Guidelines range will not. As Judge Young of the
District of Massachusetts asked in response to several pre-Rita circuit court opinions which drew
the same distinction, "[c]an it seriously be argued. . . that appellate standards of review do not or
should not influence a sentencing court's use of its discretion?" United States v. Kandirakis, 441
F. Supp. 2d 282, 298 n.36 (D. Mass. 2006).
288
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2467.
289
Mullen & Davis, supra note 260, at 639.
290
Id. at 639-40.
291
Id. at 640.
292
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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lines sentence ...the more compelling the justification based on factors in section 3553(a) that the judge must offer in order to enable the court of appeals to
assess the reasonableness of the sentence imposed., 293 Although the lines of
demarcation distinguishing the federal circuit courts that have adopted this type
of review from those that have not are not as clearly defined as they are in the
case of the presumption of reasonableness, the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied extent-of-the-variance review to at
least some Guidelines variances.294 While the courts that have adopted this approach to reasonableness review justify it by observing that the Sentencing
Guidelines represent "the best estimate of Congress's conception of reasonableness,"2 95 and therefore an "extreme divergence [from the Guidelines] ... should
be considered reasonable only under dramatic facts, 296 Mullen and Davis cite
the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Moreland, in which it held that
the mitigating factors identified by the district court as justifying a downward
variance from a 360-month Guidelines range to 120 months were sufficient to
warrant some downward variance, but were not "so compelling as to warrant a
two-thirds reduction from the bottom of the advisory guideline range, '2 97 as
"abundantly clear [evidence] that any variance imposed in the Fourth Circuit is
judged by the degree that it 298
varies from the Guidelines range, not how well it
serves the § 3553(a) factors.'
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the constitutional status of extent-of-the-variance review in Gall v. United States,299 but like its decisions in
Booker and Rita, Gall's attempt to articulate a compromise position on the issue
risks introducing greater uncertainty by eliminating the relatively clear rules that
the courts of appeals had developed and replacing them with a vague standard
that provides little guidance in specific cases. In Gall, the petitioner had
pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to distribute ecstasy for approximately seven months, from February or March 2000 through September 2000,
while a student at the University of Iowa. After withdrawing from the conspiracy, Gall graduated from the university and lived a law-abiding life until April
2004, when he was indicted on the conspiracy charge stemming from his in293

United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005). Although Dean held that extent-

of-the-variance review applies equally "in either direction-that of greater severity, or that of
greater lenity," id, a statistical review of appellate court rulings illustrates that the courts are
uniformly more deferential to upward variances than to downward ones. See infra Part IV.B.
294
See United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006); Dean, 414 F.3d at 729; United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d
1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 594 (10th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1238-39 (11 th Cir. 2006).
295
Cage, 451 F.3d at 594.
296
Id.
297 Moreland, 437 F.3d at 437, quoted in Mullen & Davis, supra note 260, at 636.
298
Mullen & Davis, supra note 260, at 636.
299
128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
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volvement in the distribution organization. Gall pleaded guilty pursuant to a
plea agreement, and cooperated with the government by fully disclosing all that
he knew of the distribution operation; he was, however, ineligible for a government-sponsored below-Guidelines sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5Kl because the information he provided was already known to the government. At
sentencing, the government acknowledged Gall's substantial efforts at selfrehabilitation in the years following his withdrawal from the conspiracy, but
urged the court to impose a sentence within the Guidelines range of 30-37
months. The district court rejected the government's request and sentenced Mr.
Gall to 36 months' probation, citing the fact that he voluntarily withdrew from
the conspiracy after a relatively short period of time and had lived a law-abiding
life in the years since then as the primary reasons motivating the belowGuidelines sentence.
The government appealed the district court's decision, and the Eighth
Circuit reversed. Applying extent-of-the-variance review, the appellate court
"held that a sentence outside of the Guidelines range must be supported by a
justification that 'is proportional to the extent of the difference between the advisory range and the sentence imposed,' 30 0 and "characteriz[ed] the difference
between a sentence of probation and the bottom of Gall's advisory Guidelines
range ... as 'extraordinary' because it amounted to 'a 100% downward variance.' 30' The Eighth Circuit therefore vacated the sentence, holding "that such
a variance
must be-and here was not-supported by extraordinary circum302
stances. ,
The Supreme Court granted Gall's petition for certiorari, and in an opinion written by Justice Stevens which sought to clarify both the propriety of extent-of-the-variance review and the scope of substantive reasonableness review
in general, reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision, holding that the appellate
court was insufficiently deferential to the district court's determination that a
sentence of probation would satisfy the section 3553(a) factors in Gall's case.
The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's premise that a sentence outside the
Guidelines range must be justified by "extraordinary" circumstances, as well as
its "use of a rigid mathematical formula that uses a percentage of a departure as
the standard for determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence," finding that both of those approaches "come too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the
Guidelines range. 30 3 Moreover, the Court concluded that application of the
300

Id.at 594 (quoting United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006)).

Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 (quoting Gall, 446 F.3d at 889). As the Supreme Court subsequently
noted, the Eighth Circuit's characterization of the sentence of probation as "extraordinary" because it constituted a 100% downward variance from the Guidelines range is conceptually unhelpful because "a sentence of probation will always be a 100% departure regardless of whether the
Guidelines range is 1 month or 100 years." 128 S.Ct. at 595.
302
Id. at 594.
303
Id. at 595.
301
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exceptional circumstances requirement and the "rigid mathematical formula-

tion ' 304 approach "reflect a practice . . . of applying a heightened standard of

review to sentences outside the Guidelines range, ' 30 5 in contravention of what
was, in the Court's view, Booker's "pellucidly clear' 30 6 instruction "that the
abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions-whether inside or outside the Guidelines range. 30 7 The Court
then summarized its view of the appropriate procedure for sentencing and review under the post-Booker Guidelines: first, the sentencing court must correctly calculate and consider the defendant's Guidelines range, and should then
hear from the parties and consider whether imposing a sentence within the
Guidelines range is consistent with the section 3553(a) factors; the court may
not presume the Guidelines range to be reasonable or appropriate during this
process. If the district court concludes that a non-Guidelines sentence is appropriate, "he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance. 30 8 The
court of appeals must then apply a deferential abuse of discretion standard of
review to the sentence imposed by the district court, regardless of whether the
sentence is within the Guidelines range or not, though the appellate court may,
as Rita indicated, apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within
the Guidelines range. While it may not presume a non-Guidelines sentence to
be unreasonable, the court may "take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range," though
it must give "due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a)
factors . . . justify the extent of the variance., 30 9 Applying this procedure to
Gall's sentence, the Supreme Court reviewed the reasons that the Eighth Circuit
gave for reversing the district court's sentence as unreasonable. The Court held
that the Eighth Circuit's decision failed to "give[] due deference to the District
Court's reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the
whole, justified the sentence," and therefore reversed the appellate court's deci3 10
sion.

While the Court obviously intended its decision in Gall to clarify the
scope of substantive reasonableness review and to define the roles of sentencing
courts and appellate courts in the federal sentencing process more precisely than
they previously had been, its opinion contains enough ambiguity and apparent
contradiction that circuit courts will find justification for widely divergent review practices within its text. It is difficult to reconcile the Court's statement
304 Id. at 596.
305
306
307

308

Id.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 597.

309 Id.
310

Id. at 602.
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that appellate courts may "take the degree of variance into account and consider
the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines" 311 and its observation that "[w]e
find it uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more
significant justification than a minor one" 3 12 with its insistence that the courts of
appeals may not demand "extraordinary" justifications for "extraordinary" departures from the Guidelines range, or apply a "mathematical ' 3 I3 formulation
based on the extent to which the sentence imposed varies in absolute terms from
the Guidelines range in order to determine the magnitude of justification required to sustain the sentence as substantively reasonable. Indeed, in light of the
appellate courts' demonstrated reluctance to displace the Guidelines' central
role in federal sentencing in response to Booker or Rita, a likely outcome of
Gall's holding will be that, while appellate courts may be somewhat more deferential toward non-Guidelines sentences, extent-of-the-variance review will
continue to be exercised as it was prior to Gall under the guise of review for
abuse of discretion, while the modicum of transparency and predictability provided by formalized practices such as the Eighth Circuit's exceptional circumstances requirement and mathematical approach will be eliminated from the
review process. Regardless of the ultimate validity of extent-of-the-variance
review in the post-Booker sentencing scheme, so long as the Sentencing Guidelines operate as "a benchmark or a point of reference or departure"3' 14 that will
exert "appreciable influence', 3 15 over the sentencing court-a practice of which
Gall expressly approved 3 16-- the application of an upwardly revised Guideline
range to a defendant whose crime was committed prior to the revision will continue to create a substantial risk of 317
increased punishment, and is therefore prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 597.
313
Id.at 595.
314
United States v. Rubenstein, 403 F.3d 93, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United States v.
Gama-Gonzalez, 469 F.3d 1109, 1110-11 (7th Cir. 2006) ("One permissible use of discretion is to
start with the Guidelines' framework, which is designed to curtail unjustified disparity in sentences-for avoiding unjustified disparity is one of the statutory objectives.").
315 Rubenstein, 403 F.3d at 98-99.
316
See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596 ("As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.").
317
On the same day that it issued its decision in Gall, the Supreme Court also issued a decision
in Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007), which held that a sentencing court may
impose a non-Guidelines sentence for an offense involving crack cocaine on the basis of its disagreement with the policy underlying the 100-to-1 ratio that until recently applied to offenses
involving crack and powder cocaine. Kimbrough, however, was largely a statutory interpretation
case, as the primary issue confronting the Court was whether the 100-to-1 ratio contained in the
Guidelines was mandated by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). The portion of the Kimbrough opinion that pertains to substantive reasonableness review simply holds
that any disparities in sentencing that may result from the fact that some district court judges may
disagree with certain policies underlying the Guidelines, while others may not, is not a sufficient
reason to prohibit the imposition of non-Guidelines sentences on the basis of such disagreement;
311

312
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EmpiricalAssessment of the Post-Booker Guidelines' PracticalEffects
on Sentencing

Henry Friendly, in an effort to articulate a definition of judicial discretion, wrote that "the trial judge has discretion in those cases where his ruling
will not be reversed simply because an appellate court disagrees. 3 1 8 By Judge
Friendly's standard, district courts enjoy very little discretion in sentencing
criminal defendants in the post-Booker era. While the above discussion of the
formal, de jure aspects of post-Booker sentencing raises a strong inference that
the Sentencing Guidelines, even in their reduced "advisory" status, remain a
sufficiently powerful influence on sentencing outcomes that the Ex Post Facto
Clause prohibits retroactive application of upwardly revised Guidelines, the
second step of the Garner inquiry-an empirical analysis of the Sentencing
Guidelines' practical effects on sentencing in actual cases-demonstrates even
more persuasively that the Guidelines continue to be applied as the default
benchmark for sentencing in all federal criminal cases, such that the retroactive
application of an upwardly revised Guidelines Manual creates a substantial risk
that the defendant will be punished more severely than would have been the
case had the court applied the Guidelines in effect at the time the offense was
committed. In some cases, the practical effect that an upwardly revised Sentencing Guideline has on the outcome of a defendant's sentence is obvious-in
Demaree, for example, the sentencing judge stated explicitly that he would have
imposed a lower sentence had he applied the pre-revision Guidelines Manual to
the calculation of Demaree's Guidelines range. 31 9 Although the court's deference to the Sentencing Guidelines as a benchmark or starting point is not expressly acknowledged in every case, a review of post-Booker sentencing statistics and reversal rates throughout the federal court system presents a clear picture of the central role that the Sentencing
Guidelines continue to play as the de
320
facto arbiter of "reasonableness.,
the Court noted that "our opinion in Booker recognized that some departures from uniformity
were a necessary cost of the remedy we adopted" in that case. 128 S. Ct. at 574. The Court further observed that "while the Guidelines are no longer binding, closer review may be in order
when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judge's view that the
Guidelines range 'fails to properly reflect § 3553(a) considerations' even in a mine-run case," but
held that such closer review was not appropriate in the case of the crack Guidelines, because in
promulgating those Guidelines the Sentencing Commission was not acting in its "characteristic
institutional role," but was acting under what it perceived to be a direct instruction from Congress
to implement a 100-to-I ratio into the Guidelines for crack offenses. Id. at 575 (quoting Rita v.
United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007)).
318
Henry J. Friendly, IndiscretionAbout Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 754 (1982).
319
See United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 792-93 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
3055 (2007) ("The judge applied the 2004 guidelines ... and sentenced Demaree to 30 months.
But he added that if the 2000 guidelines were applicable to her case instead, he would have sentenced her to only 27 months ... ").
320
Judge Nancy Gertner of the District of Massachusetts has explained that sentencing courts'
deference to the Guidelines range as a benchmark against which to exercise their sentencing dis-
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According to the Sentencing Commission's statistics, the "rate of conformance with the sentencing guidelines," defined as the combined rate of
within-Guideline and government-sponsored below-Guideline sentences in all
32 1
federal district courts, was 85.9 percent in the first calendar year after Booker,
down from 93.7 percent in the 13-month period preceding Blakely,322 but easily
sufficient to demonstrate that the Guidelines remain a dominant influence on
sentencing courts. For fiscal year 2006, the same rate increased to 86.3 percent,323 increased again to 86.7 percent for fiscal year 2007,324 and remained at
86.7 percent in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008, according to the Sentencing
Commission's preliminary quarterly data.325 Finally, the Sentencing Commission recently released a report comparing sentencing statistics prior to the
Court's decisions in Gall and Kimbrough on December 10, 2007, with statistics
after that date.326 This report indicates that the rate of Guidelines compliance in
the months after Gall and Kimbrough was 84.8 percent, not substantially lower
than the cumulative rate of Guidelines compliance during the period from the
Court's decision in Booker through the end of the fourth quarter of 2007, which
the report found to be 86.1 percent.3 27 This high rate of compliance with the
Guidelines strongly supports the conclusion that the Ex Post Facto Clause continues to apply to the Sentencing Guidelines under current law. Although the
cretion may be inevitable regardless of the degree of formal discretion to impose a non-Guidelines
sentence that they may enjoy, due to the psychological concept of "anchoring." Judge Gertner
writes that "[ainchoring is a strategy used to simplify complex tasks, in which 'numeric judgments
are assimilated to a previously considered standard.' When asked to make a judgment, decisionmakers take an initial starting value (i.e., the anchor) and then adjust it up or down. Studies underscore the significance of that initial anchor; judgments tend to be strongly biased in its direction. In effect, the 300-odd page Guideline Manual provides ready-made anchors." Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 137,
138 (2006) (quoting Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty. AnchoringEffects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1536 (2001)).
321

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES

v. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 57 (2006) [hereinafter "Booker Report"], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/booker-report/BookerReport.pdf.
322
Id. at 45 n.242 (defining the "post-PROTECT Act time period"), 46.
323

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT FISCAL YEAR

2006 1 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sccases/USSCQuarterReportFinal 06.pdf.
It should be noted that because the government's fiscal year runs from October 1 through September 30, sentencing data from the first quarter of fiscal year 2006 is counted both in the Booker
Report, supra note 321 and in this report.
324

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT FISCAL YEAR

2007 1 (2008), availableat http://www.ussc.gov/sc-cases/QuarterReportFinal_07.pdf.
325

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,

PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT

1

(2008) (First quarter release, October 1, 2007, through December 31, 2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sc-cases/USSC 2008_QuarterReport 1st.pdf.
326
See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY POST-KImiRouGHIGALL DATA
(2008),
ary_08.pdf.
327
Id. at 2.
REPORT

available at

http://www.ussc.gov/USSCKimbroughGallReportFebru-
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Third Circuit's decision in FormanH held that a compliance rate of 75.4 percent
with the Parole Guidelines was insufficient to establish that the Parole Guidelines were "laws" within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause, 328 the rate of
compliance with the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines is much higher, and the
Supreme Court's opinions in Morales and Garner suggest that Forman H applied an excessively restrictive standard to the identification of legislative enactments governed by the Ex Post Facto Clause. The correct inquiry is not, as
Forman H held, whether the Guidelines form an "unyielding conduit" from
which the governmental entity charged with their implementation lacks "substantial flexibility" 329 to depart, but rather whether the Guidelines exert sufficient influence over the entity's exercise of discretion so as to create "a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered
crimes., 330 Although the district court in Garner never determined on remand
whether the revised parole rule at issue in that case did in fact create a sufficient
risk of increased injury, and the Supreme Court has not revisited the issue since
Garner, the fact that district courts impose within-Guidelines or governmentsponsored below-Guidelines sentences between 86 and 87 percent of the time in
the post-Booker era provides compelling evidence that retroactive application of
upwardly revised Sentencing Guidelines would present a significant risk of increased punishment, and that the Ex Post Facto Clause therefore continues to
prohibit the retroactive application of the Guidelines.
When the rate of appellate reversal of Guidelines variances is taken into
account, the conclusion that retroactive application of upwardly revised Guidelines creates a substantial risk of increased punishment becomes inescapable.
Although the Sentencing Commission has never promulgated a statistical analysis of the relationship between appellate reversals and the Sentencing Guidelines
range under post-Booker reasonableness review, the New York Council of Defense Lawyers ("NYCDL") undertook such an analysis of 1,515 appellate cases
decided between January 1, 2006, and November 16, 2006, which it submitted
as an Appendix to its amicus curiae brief in support of the petitioner in Rita.33'
The NYCDL Report found that, while the circuits that have not explicitly
adopted a presumption of reasonableness are slightly more tolerant of Guidelines variances than circuits that have adopted the presumption, all of the federal
appellate circuits indisputably treat the Sentencing Guidelines range as the default "reasonable" sentence, one for which a sentencing court need not provide
any justification beyond the fact that it is recommended by the Guidelines, while
variances from the Guidelines, particularly sentences below the Guidelines
328
329
330

Forman I, 776 F.2d 1156, 1163 (3d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1160 (quoting FormanI, 709 F.2d 852, 862 (3d Cir. 1983)).
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000) (quoting Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S.

499, 509 (1995)).
331
Appendix to Brief for New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Rita v. United States, No. 06-5754 [hereinafter "NYCDL Report"], available at
http://www.nycdl.org/itemcontent/booker/NYCDLreasonablenessreview.PDF.
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range, are subjected to much more onerous scrutiny. Of the 1,152 appeals of
within-Guidelines sentences that the NYCDL reviewed, only sixteen, or approximately 1.4 percent, were reversed-and fifteen of those reversals were on
procedural grounds.332 Moreover, significant disparities existed between appeals of above-Guidelines variances, which were affirmed as reasonable in 147
of 154 cases, 3 33 and below-Guidelines variances, which were reversed as unreasonably lenient in 60 of the 71 cases appealed by the government, but affirmed
in all 138 cases appealed by the defendant. 334 Indeed, some courts have gone so
far as to suggest that a below-Guidelines sentence can never be unreasonably
high.335
While the formal analysis in Part IV.A above might suggest that the Ex
Post Facto Clause should apply to revised Sentencing Guidelines only in those
circuits that apply the presumption of reasonableness, the NYCDL's research
indicates that the application of upwardly revised Guidelines at sentencing
would create a significant risk of increased punishment for defendants in any
federal court, as even the federal circuits that do not apply a formal presumption
of reasonableness are nevertheless highly deferential to the Guidelines in prac3
tice. 33
36 The seven federal circuits that have adopted the presumption of reasonableness collectively affirmed within-Guidelines sentences appealed by the defendant in 686 out of 693 cases, or approximately 99 percent. 337 By comparison, the five circuits that have not adopted the presumption affirmed withinGuidelines sentences in 450 of 459 cases, or 98 percent. 338 Both groups of circuit courts have shown a similar tolerance for above-Guidelines variances and
hostility to below-Guidelines variances. Circuits applying the presumption of
reasonableness collectively affirmed 88 of 93 upward variances-approximately
332

Id. at 3a. In UnitedStates v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2006), the only case in which

a federal appellate court has found a within-Guidelines sentence to be substantively unreasonable,
the successful appellant was subsequently re-sentenced to the same 87-month sentence that the
circuit court initially vacated, and her re-sentencing was affirmed as reasonable. See United States
v. Goodwin, 486 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2007).
333
NYCDL Report, supra note 331, at 2a.
334
Id.
335
For example, in United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005), the court commented that "[i]t is hard to conceive of below-range sentences that would be unreasonably high," a
sentiment that was reaffirmed and expanded in United States v. Tahzib, 513 F.3d 692 (7th Cir.
2008) ("If a below-guidelines sentence will almost never be unreasonable, the same must be true
for the lowest possible within-guidelines sentence.") (citing George, 403 F.3d at 473). See also
United States v. Griffin, 187 F. App'x 13, 16 (1st Cir. 2006) (observing that although "[a] presumption of reasonableness may not attach to a guidelines sentence . . . a sentence below the
guideline range nonetheless suggests mitigating factors are already at work").
336
Cf United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 297 n.36 (D. Mass. 2006) (noting that
"the Guidelines are given paramount consideration" even in circuits that have not adopted the
presumption of reasonableness).
337
NYCDL Report, supra note 331, at 3a.
338 Id.
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95 percent-while the other circuits collectively affirmed 59 of 61 upward variances, or 97 percent.339 Conversely, the circuits applying the presumption of
reasonableness collectively reversed 47 of the 51 downward variances that were
appealed by the government during the relevant time frame, a reversal rate of 92
percent, while the other circuits collectively reversed 13 of 20 downward variances appealed by the government-a reversal rate of 65 percent. 340 Although
the reversal rate of downward variances in circuits not applying the presumption
of reasonableness is significantly lower than the rate in circuits that do apply the
presumption, the relatively small set of downward variance cases in nopresumption circuits examined in the NYCDL Report, in conjunction with the
facts that those circuits still reversed over half of the downward variances appealed by the government and that the vast majority of defendants even in nopresumption circuits are sentenced within the Guidelines, suggests that even in
those circuits, sentencing outcomes are still tightly bound to the Sentencing
Guidelines, and that the application of upwardly revised Guidelines to a defendant's sentence will almost inevitably result in a higher sentence than would
have been the case under the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense.
Of course, Demaree might nevertheless be defended as correctly decided
if the Seventh Circuit, despite having adopted the presumption of reasonableness and applying extent-of-the-variance review, were a statistical anomaly in
which the general sentencing trends identified by the NYCDL did not apply.
However, the NYCDL's analysis demonstrates that, although the Seventh Circuit has formally defined "reasonableness" under Booker in quite deferential
terms "as meaning 'something like lying well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion,' 341 its application of that standard to Guidelines'
variances, particularly downward variances, has not borne out in practice Demaree's promise of "light appellate review ' 342 of sentencing decisions. The
NYCDL Report indicates that, during the relevant time frame, the Seventh Circuit reversed four of the six downward variances appealed by the government,
while affirming all eight upward variances appealed by the defendant, and reversing-on procedural grounds--only one of the 86 within-Guidelines sentences appealed by the defendant.3 43 In the Sixth Circuit, which issued the dicta
in Barton upon which Demaree relied, 3 " the NYCDL Report indicates that the
court affirmed 90 of the 91 within-Guidelines sentences and 15 of the 17 aboveGuidelines variances, while reversing one of the two downward variances pre339

Id.

340

Id.

341

United States v. Wallace, 458 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hardaway v. Young,

302 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2002)).
342
United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3055
(2007).
NYCDL Report, supra note 331, at 5a, 16a-3 Ia.
344
United States v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649, 655 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006), cited in Demaree, 459 F.3d
at 794; see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
343
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sented for review.3 45 Likewise, notwithstanding Chief Judge Jones's description
of the Sentencing Guidelines as merely "informative" and "purely advisory" in
Rodarte-Vasquez,34 the Fifth Circuit's record of appellate review demonstrates
quite clearly that it views the Guidelines as far more than simple "advice." The
NYCDL found that, during the same time frame, the Fifth Circuit affirmed 27 of
28, or 96 percent, of the upward variances it reviewed, and affirmed all 86
within-Guidelines sentences, while reversing all five downward variances that
were appealed by the government.3 47 The same is true in the Eleventh Circuit,
348
despite that court's expression of sympathy for Demaree's holding in Mathis.
According to the NYCDL Report, the Eleventh Circuit, despite having declined
to adopt a presumption of reasonableness, affirmed all 23 upward variances and
190 of 191 within-Guidelines sentences appealed by the defendant within the
relevant time frame, while reversing 5 of the 9 downward variances appealed by
the government.3 49 In these circuits, as in all other federal circuits, the review
statistics clearly indicate that the Guidelines continue to strongly influence sentencing decisions and reasonableness review, and that the retroactive application
of an upwardly revised Guidelines range would create a substantial risk of increased punishment for a criminal defendant sentenced under the revised Guidelines Manual.
V. CONCLUSION: THE Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE PROHIBITS RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF UPWARDLY REVISED SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE POST-

BOOKER ERA
The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Demaree applied an
obsolete methodology to a set of implausible assumptions about the realities of
post-Booker sentencing in order to reach a patently unjust outcome, stripping
criminal defendants of a fundamental constitutional protection against ex post
facto legislation on the basis of the Sentencing Guidelines' supposedly "advisory" status that is, both in form and practice, much more than merely advisory
on the courts. The result is a one-way ratcheting system that almost inevitably
increases the degree of punishment imposed on defendants to whom it is applied. Under Demaree, the sentencing court must retroactively apply the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date of the defendant's sentencing, including any
revisions that result in a higher Guidelines range than would have been the case
under the Guidelines in effect at the time the defendant's offense was commit345

NYCDL Report, supranote 331, at 5a, 95a-1 15a.
United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2007) (Jones, C.J., concurring); see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
347
NYCDL Report, supra note 331, at 5a, 72a-94a.
348
United States v. Mathis, 239 F. App'x 513, 517 n.2 (11 th Cir. 2007); see supra note 99 and
accompanying text.
349
NYCDL Report, supra note 331, at 6a, 204a-39a.
346
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ted.35 ° If the district court grants a downward variance from the "advisory"
Guidelines range, its leniency is likely to be reversed as "unreasonable" by the
appellate court, while a sentence within or above the revised Guidelines range is
almost certain to be affirmed. This is precisely the type of situation, involving
the failure to provide fair notice to defendants of the potential penalties imposed
by law on their actions, and, more significantly, creating the possibility of arbitrary or vindictive legislation, that the Ex Post Facto Clause was intended to
prevent.
The Supreme Court's chief concern in Booker, as well as earlier cases
such as Apprendi and Blakely, was with protecting a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights against unconstitutional sentence enhancements imposed on
the basis of judicially-found facts proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. Despite the Court's pro-defendant intentions, however, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Demaree, in conjunction with the manner in which postBooker reasonableness review has been implemented by the federal courts of
appeals, has created a perverse situation in which defendants are deprived of
another fundamental right-the constitutional protection against ex post facto
laws-while enjoying no appreciable increase in protection from sentencing
enhancements applied on the basis of judicially-found facts than was the case
under the pre-Booker regime.3 5' In light of that reality, the Demaree court's
suggestion that its holding was in the interests of criminal defendants, protecting
35 2
them from the government's "rearguard action against Booker," rings hollow.
Some district courts within the Seventh Circuit have mitigated the effects of Demaree by
assuming the discretionary ability to apply either the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing
or those in effect at the time the offense was committed. See United States v. Jung, 473 F.3d 837,
844 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Caputo, 456 F. Supp. 2d 970, 983-84 (N.D. Ill. 2006); see
also Douglas Berman, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY, Does The Seventh Circuit Know Its Own
Law?, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglawand_policy/2007/01/does-the-sevent.html/
(Jan. 18, 2007 5:06 PM). While the assertion of the discretionary ability to apply the lower
Guidelines in effect when the offense was committed avoids some of the unfairness that would
accompany a consistent application of the Demaree rule, that approach is flatly inconsistent with
the Guidelines Manual's express direction that the sentencing court "shall" apply the Guidelines
in effect on the date of sentencing, unless doing so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clausewhich, under Demaree, cannot happen. U.S.S.G. § 1Bl. 11(a) (emphasis added). The fact that
some courts within the Seventh Circuit feel compelled to apply an earlier version of the Guidelines in clear violation of § 1B 1.1 (a) is further proof that these courts view the Guidelines range
as a benchmark that makes a real difference to a defendant's ultimate sentence even in the postBooker era.
351
Cf Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2476 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Court's development of substantive reasonableness
review "has reintroduced the constitutional defect that Booker purported to eliminate"); see also
United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 297, 320 (D. Mass. 2006) (arguing that under
post-Booker reasonableness review, "the Guidelines-and their judge-made factual findings-are
still the driving force behind federal sentencing," and that "[t]he jury is now relegated to an advisory capacity").
352
United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 3055
(2007).
350
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Given the Seventh Circuit's established practice of reversing most downward
variances while affirming virtually all within-Guidelines sentences and upward
variances, Demaree's reference to the "advisory" nature of the post-Booker
Guidelines hardly seems a defendant-friendly justification for depriving defendants of a constitutional prohibition on ex post facto legislation intended to protect them from increased punishment.
No other federal circuit court has yet adopted the view that the Ex Post
Facto Clause no longer applies to the retroactive application of revised editions
of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual in the post-Booker era, but several courts
have been sufficiently persuaded by the superficial appeal of Demaree's reasoning to express sympathy for its holding in dicta, and at least one district court
outside the Seventh Circuit has held on the basis of Demaree that the retroactive
application of upwardly revised Sentencing Guidelines is no longer precluded
by the Ex Post Facto Clause. More circuit courts will have to address ex post
facto challenges to the application of revised Sentencing Guidelines in the foreseeable future; it is therefore essential for courts facing this issue to recognize
that the Supreme Court's decisions in CaliforniaDepartment of Corrections v.
Morales and Garnerv. Jones rejected the categorical distinction between "laws"
and "guideposts" that was developed by the federal appellate courts in response
to ex post facto challenges to the Parole Guidelines, and to apply the twopronged Garner analysis to the Sentencing Guidelines more carefully than Demaree did. The other federal courts of appeals should decline to extend Demaree's erroneous ruling to their own jurisdictions, thereby limiting the injustice created by the Demaree rule to a single federal circuit and, one might hope,
encouraging the Seventh Circuit to revisit the issue en banc. In a hypothetical
world in which Booker and Demaree's promise of a sentencing scheme in which
district courts enjoy broad discretion to depart from the Guidelines to whatever
extent they find justified by an individualized assessment of the circumstances
presented in a defendant's case was fulfilled, and in which the appellate courts
applied a standard of reasonableness review that was as deferential to the district
court's judgment as the fictitious characterization of post-Booker appellate review employed by the Demaree court to rationalize its holding, or the idealized
standard described by the Supreme Court in Rita and Gall, then a compelling
case might be made that subsequent revisions to the Sentencing Guidelines,
reflecting the informed expertise of the Sentencing Commission, should not be
limited in their retroactive application by the constitutional restraint imposed by
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Until the day arrives, however, when appellate
courts' review practices match Demaree and Rita's deferential rhetoric, the constitutional rights of criminal defendants should not be sacrificed to a formalistic
ex post facto analysis that ignores both Supreme Court precedent and the reality
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines' overriding influence in post-Booker
sentencing.
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